388 
SILVER MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY; 1893 . 
landing parties about 2000 strong extremely improbable, if not impos¬ 
sible, because (a) few modern ships of war can carry troops; (b) none 
have men to spare from their crews, when they themselves are to be 
engaged; ( c) the presence of transports will at once put the defence 
on the alert; id) the landing of such a force will take a considerable 
time; (e) if such a force is landed, its relation to the ships is the same 
as if it was a large one, but as its self-contained power is smaller, its 
chances of getting away again are also much smaller, for embarkation 
is well-nigh impossible if the enemy cannot be kept out of range. 
At Aboukir Bay, 1 2 in 1801, the marshalling of the boats conveying 
the first detachments numbering about 2000 men, took many hours, 
although the fleet and troops had had far more practice than is ever 
probable in future. At Lissa, 3 in 1866, the attempt to land 2200 men 
took many hours to prepare and was then abandoned before the Aus¬ 
trian fleet was signalled. 
Torpedo boat raids to destroy shipping, dock gates, &c., are perhaps 
the most probable of all forms of attack, because the size and speed of 
the boats render injury to them improbable unless they are stopped by 
obstructions in narrow waters defended by quick-firing ordnance. 
No exact form of attack can be predicted. It is not likely that more 
than one or two boats will be employed at a time. Their aim will be 
to reach their objective unobserved, and the method of effecting this 
must vary with local conditions. 
There is one other form of attack which should be noticed, because 
bases of supply, such as Cardiff, where the object would be to destroy 
dock gates, and so impede shipments, are liable to it; viz., the use of 
high explosives conveyed in trading vessels. This will be prevented 
if all ships are compelled to anchor outside of the defences for exam¬ 
ination, and each ship’s agent at the port is made responsible for her. 
In fog neither can torpedo boat raids be stopped, nor vessels carrying 
high explosives prevented reaching the vicinity of dock gates, without 
the defence has an efficient organisation of swift guard-boats. 
CONCLUSION. 
To sum up 
In forcing a passage the risks include the possible loss of a ship or 
perhaps more. On the other hand it is almost certain that some of the 
ships will get past, though their injuries will be severe and the prob¬ 
ability of receiving them will increase from year to year. 
In a bombardment there is a risk of serious injury to all the ships 
engaged, but a small one of actual loss. There is, however, a certainty 
of an enormous expenditure of ammunition with no lasting result, 
unless the fortress is badly constructed and hadly manned. 
Command of the sea is necessary before any serious attack on a sea 
fortress can be undertaken, because time, free communication with the 
base, and the co-operation of land forces are requisite. 
A naval force cannot alone capture or destroy land defences except 
in circumstances that should be exceptional. 
1 Military and Naval Operations ; Colomb. Lecture 34, Aldershot Military Society, 1891. 
2 Attack on Lissa, 1866; Lewis. Iv.E. Occasional Papers, Vol. IX. 
