2 
army to which he belongs. He should love his company more than himself, his 
battalion more than his company, his regiment more than his battalion.” The 
object of peace manoeuvres should be to render these theoretical principles 
instinctive in the soldier. With this object in view certain special exercises 
would be introduced in order to accustom the soldier to face death without flinch¬ 
ing, such as artillery firing over the heads of infantry. General Dragomirov, 
indeed, would go so far as to make a recruit stand in the open between two 
targets whilst a good marksman fired three or four shots at each target in succes¬ 
sion at 50 yards range ! 
But at the same time the soldier must be practically convinced that his com¬ 
rades are animated with the same spirit of devotion. His motto should be 
“ Don’t think of yourself, your comrades will think of you.” The theoretical 
knowledge and practical ability of the officers should be employed in directing 
the troops in such a manner as to enable this “ camaradie de combat ” to be 
exercised under the most favourable conditions. This is the great object of 
tactics. 
It may be said then, that, in Greneral Dragomirov’s opinion, combined exercises 
should aim at the following results :— 
(1.) To put in evidence the tactical principles which ought to guide the 
employment of troops. 
(2.) To develop the manoeuvring power of the troops and the tactical “ coup 
d'ceil” of the officers. 
(3.) To impress in a practical manner upon the troops the reciprocal obliga¬ 
tions imposed upon them by the “ camaradie de combat ,” and to place them, in a 
rational and progressive manner, in situations analogous to those which may be 
presented upon the field of battle. 
Having thus indicated General Dragomirov’s special ideas, we will briefly 
notice his remarks upon the exercises practised by his troops, especially those 
which relate to artillery. 
Exercises with Ammunition against a Marked Enemy. 
Strength of the Detachment : One Regiment of Infantry and one Battery with 
four guns. 
The General finds fault with the infantry for not covering the battery when it 
advanced to take up a position. He says that this would never have occurred in 
an exercise specially intended to test their knowledge when acting in conjunction 
with artillery, and is like forgetting one’s letters when learning to read. It is a 
great mistake to keep one’s knowledge locked up in compartments, as it were. 
Although it is necessary that complicated questions should be studied in detail, 
all this preliminary work must be blended into a single whole, otherwise there 
will be no military training in the true and complete sense of the word. 
After finding fault with some details of the infantry advance, he says that the 
artillery remained too far behind (about a mile). This shows too much caution. 
Effective fire should not be the only object of the artillery. They should impress 
upon the minds of the enemy the conviction that nothing will prevent them from 
gaining ground. To object that changes of position expose the guns too much, 
only shows ignorance of war. Our own losses are seen, but those of the enemy 
cannot be estimated. Guns must not be nursed when thousands of lives are at 
stake. Moreover, infantry are much more confident and cheerful when their 
guns are near at hand, and confidence is a most important element in war. 
The General also finds fault with the Infantry Commander for distributing his 
reserves too much along the whole line, instead of bringing them up in force 
upon the decisive point, and he blames the reserves themselves for halting to fire 
