4 
The General criticises the defending force for making their counter-attack with 
their local reserves only, the general reserves not coming np until the position 
was carried. He approves of an attack made upon this general reserve by a 
regiment of Cossacks, and says that, although the regiment might have suffered 
heavily, it acted in accordance witli the principles of the “ ccunaradie de combat ” 
in supporting its infantry at the critical period of the struggle by delaying the 
advance of the reserves. He finds fault with the front line of the attack for 
lying down to fire, and says that the great principle to instil upon the soldier is 
not to try and get cover for himself, but to take up the most advantageous posi¬ 
tion for firing. The utilisation of cover thus understood, becomes a consequence 
of tactical principle, not its object. Reserves should not be hurried up with 
unnecessary rapidity, but the men should be kept as fresh as possible for the 
final assault. 
Speaking of an “ enveloping attack,” the General remarks that this is easier 
talked about than carried out. The enemy will not go to sleep. He will 
manoeuvre, and, speaking generally, it may be said that under these conditions 
an “ enveloping ” attack will become a frontal action as far as concerns the troops 
actually engaged in it. 
We will now give a summary of the tactical ideas upon which General Drago- 
mirov specially insists. 
(1.) Success in war requires before everything the most perfect union and 
cohesion between every fraction of the army. The different arms, the different 
units in each arm, the individuals in each unit, should co-operate, actively and 
incessantly, towards the common object. In time of peace then, the soldiers’ 
training should aim at inculcating the notion of duty, and of giving them the 
experience necessary for them to fulfil instinctively upon the field of battle the 
obligations imposed upon them by the “ camaradie de combat ,” placing them 
always, at the same time, under the best possible conditions in a tactical point of 
view. 
(2.) In order to gain a victory, it is not necessary to be absolutely stronger 
than the enemy, but only to be stronger than him on the point or in the zone of 
the decisive attack at the moment when that attack is made. The tactical skill 
of the Commander must, therefore, be directed towards ensuring a convergence 
of efforts upon this point or in this zone. The same principle must be borne in 
mind, if occasion requires, by the subordinate officers. In all cases the leading 
idea with regard to the employment of troops is not to distribute them evenly 
along the line to be attacked, but by utilisation of ground to economise the forces 
necessary to produce the maximum effect upon the decisive points. 
(3.) The concentration of infantry and artillery fire upon the point of attack 
is insufficient to produce decisive results. If the enemy is to be obliged to 
retreat, the attack must be pushed to extremities, that is to say, the bayonet 
must be called into play or, to speak more accurately, ground must be gained 
with such decision and continuity as to force the enemy to the conclusion that it 
will be impossible for them to resist the progress of the attack. When this 
point is reached, the assailants will have broken the equilibrium of moral forces, 
and the battle will be gained. 
(4.) The choice of the point and of the moment of attack belongs to the 
Commander. Tor instance, an endeavour may be made to turn one of the 
enemy’s flanks. But, whatever may be the point selected, the troops charged 
with the execution of the attack should be properly placed, and set in motion in 
the right direction. They should have nothing to do but to march straight to 
the front, and as rapidly as possible, upon the point named. The dispositions 
adopted should, therefore, allow of a constant advance from front to rear, i.e., 
