COMMENDED ESSAY, 1893 . 
393 
The attack by ships, assisted by naval landing parties, is less likely 
to be attempted in the future than in the past. Modern war-ships 
have few men to spare, and landing under fire is a most difficult 
manoeuvre. 
Serious naval attacks should never be attempted from a doubtfully 
commanded sea, unless either 
(1.) The enemy’s ships can be evaded by surprise and celerity, 
or (2.) Sufficient naval force is available, in addition to the attack¬ 
ing force, to mask the enemy. 
It may be noted that tlie introduction of steam bas tended to make 
a doubtful command of tbe sea more doubtful, and an absolute com¬ 
mand more secure. 
(b.) For the purpose of ravage and destruction . 
Naval attacks of this nature have been carried out in the past and 
may be expected in the future. The usual course adopted being that 
of long range bombardment. 
The ships will be unwilling to risk themselves, and will probably 
keep under weigh, as well as at long range, though by so doing they 
cannot expect to do much destruction, and should the fire of the 
fortress not be very formidable they will find it worth their while to 
anchor. 
Another form of ravaging attack, which is likely to be much at¬ 
tempted in the future, is that of sudden inroads into harbours by 
small craft and torpedo boats. 
Light ravaging attacks may be made across a doubtfully commanded 
sea, where serious ones could not be thought of. 
(c.) For the purpose of passing in order to get to an objective beyond , i.e ., 
forcing a channel. 
This is the most feasible form of attack by ships. It is necessary 
that there should be something for the fleet to do beyond, and that 
once past or through the fortress they should have matters fairly their 
own way. 
We have many instances of this case in the past. That forts alone 
are powerless to stop ships running past is an axiom which has been 
proved over and over again, but forts in conjunction with obstacles are 
very difficult to cope with. Since the introduction of submarine mines, 
it is highly improbable that valuable ships will be ever risked, in the 
absence of proper appliances for clearing mine-fields, by trying to rush 
close waters, but at the commencement of a war, knowing the feeling 
against submarine mines and the difficulty of laying them, it is not 
impossible that swift small craft may attempt such rushes. 
(d.) and {e.) For the purpose of covering some other operation or pro¬ 
ducing moral effect. 
These two may be taken together, as the method employed will be 
the same in either case, i.e. 3 as in ( h .), most likely long range bom¬ 
bardment under weigh. 
