394 
COMMENDED ESSAY, 1893 . 
Combined Naval and Military Attacks. 
(a.) With a view to conquest and occupation. 
This form of attack has been proved by history, and is universally 
acknowledged to be the only sure way of attacking a fortress. Troops 
are necessary to hold a place once taken, and, having troops, to attack 
directly by sea is to run useless risks. Failure on the part of the 
military attack does not weaken the naval force, whereas, if the naval 
force suffers and has to withdraw, the military force loses its base. 
The part the navy plays is a secondary one. It conveys the troops 
across the sea, lands them, and then acts as their base, only actively 
co-operating in the attack when, in some special cases, it may be able 
to assist the army with its fire. 
It is very important that the commanders of the two services should 
pull together, instances of failure in the past can often be traced to 
lack of unanimity between General and Admiral. 
All possible interference by a relieving army must be taken into 
account, and provided for, if necessary, by a covering force. Fear of 
interruption being at an end, the siege on the land side can be pushed 
on by regular stages. 
Since the besiegers intend to possess and make use of the port, 
harbour, or dockyard when captured, they will not, if they can possibly 
avoid it, destroy anything which they hope will become their property, 
and confine their assaults to the fortifications. In fact it has been 
said that an attempt to destroy any portion of the objective beyond 
the defences may be taken as a proof that the assailants have given 
up the expectation of capture and as a sign of the abandonment of the 
attack. 
The design of modern war-ships has a good deal altered the ques¬ 
tion of transport. In the days of sailing and early steam ships most 
men-of-war had plenty of room for troops. Now there is no such 
room, and troops have to be carried in transports convoyed by men-of- 
war, a troublesome operation. But, on the other hand, the enormous 
accommodation of modern transports enables us to do with far fewer 
ships than formerly, though, of course, this means fewer boats and 
means of disembarkation. * 
Extensive combined operations should never be attempted without 
command of the sea, but, failing absolute command, they might be 
feasible if sufficient naval forces were available, in addition to the 
attacking force, to 
(1.) Mask the enemy in his ports. 
(2.) Cover the attacking force at the scene of operations. 
Without command of the sea, a fortress, though taken, must ulti¬ 
mately fall unless it can get its supplies from the land, which will be 
unlikely in an enemy^s country. 
(b.) For purposes of ravage and destruction or to force a channel. 
Troops have been used in the past, in conjunction with ships, for 
attacks with either of these objects, and may be so employed in the 
future, especially in the latter case, for the development of submarine 
mines may make the clearing of a channel such a difficult operation 
