COMMENDED ESSAY, 1893 . 
395 
that it may be advisable to land troops to take the batteries of tlie 
fortress in rear, and if possible silence them, before the ships attempt 
to clear their way through. 
Foreign Powers have not adopted countermining, which points to 
the probability of their employing this method of attack. 
To sum up, the various forms of attack which are likely to be 
attempted against a coast fortress are four in number, and as follows :— 
(1.) Raiding attack by small craft. 
(2.) Forcing a channel by ships. 
(3.) Bombardment by ships. 
(4.) Combined attack by sea and land forces. 
PART II. 
Historical. 
Want of space debars us from describing as fully as we should wish 
the details of attacks which have occurred in the past, and we can 
merely notice the various causes which led to success or failure as they 
occurred, only going into detail in the more modern and important 
cases. 
(I.) Bombardment . (WitA a view to ravage and destruction ).—The 
principal instances we have of this form of attack are those of the 
French ports in 1694-5 and 1759, Algiers in 1806, Odessa and Swea- 
borg in 1854-5, and, lastly, Alexandria in 1882. 
In the attacks on the French ports the ships expended enormous 
quantities of ammunition, keeping at long range. As a rule the town 
was set on fire, but the damage done was rarely equivalent to the 
expense incurred. They were carried out from a commanded sea. 
At Algiers the system of fortifications was so weak that by bringing 
the ships close in against the Mole a numerical advantage in guns 
of two to one could be attained. This was accordingly done, the ships 
engaging at even 50 yards. The action lasted seven hours, by which 
time “the sea defences, with great part of the town itself, were in 
ruins.” Certain batteries, on high sites, were, however, intact. The 
ships expended all their ammunition, 49,000 rounds, and were some¬ 
what damaged. Success was due to (1) careful planning of the attack; 
(2) inferiority of the garrison ; (3) blunder on the part of the fortress 
in letting the ships take up their positions unmolested; (4) weakness 
of the fortifications; (5) command of the sea. 
The attack on Odessa was carried out by ships under weigh, first at 
fairly long ranges, and then closer as the fire of the fortress was sub¬ 
dued. The result was that “ the batteries, docks, and port, barracks, 
and abundant supplies of ammunition and military stores were utterly 
destroyed.” 
4 he bombardment of Sweaborg was one of the greatest ever under¬ 
taken. Special mortar-boats were used. The ships all kept at long 
range and in motion, the gun-boats circling, and the position of the 
mortar-boats being altered by hawsers ahead and astern. 10,000 pro¬ 
jectiles were fired in 11 hours. The result was one great explosion 
and many fires, though the Russians denied that any damage was done 
French ports 
Algiers. 
Odessa. 
Sweaborg. 
