COMMENDED ESSAY, 1893 . 
397 
Charleston was first attacked in 1740. A combined attack was charleston, 
intended, but the troops were cut off by the sea, and it took the form 
of simple bombardment. An attempt to bring the ships close in 
resulted in the grounding of several, one frigate being lost. After 10 
hours’ action the ships withdrew, terribly shattered, having made no 
sensible impression on the works. Failure was due to (1) collapse of 
the troops ; (2) lack of an accurate chart. 
Eighty-seven years later Charleston was again attacked from the sea, 
the Federals thinking that with their new monitors and shell guns they 
had made a clean sweep of history. In two engagements with Fort 
McAlister (an earthwork mounting nine guns) the Montauk (a monitor) 
was struck 59 times, and only succeeded in disabling one gun in the 
fort. A month later three monitors attacked the same fort at a range, 
of 1200 yards, and after eight hours’ action the ships drew off, having 
inflicted but slight damage on the fort and being considerably damaged 
themselves. But the Navy Department still insisted on continuing 
this form of attack, and the Admiral attacked the fortress with seven 
monitors and one broadside ship. The ships mounted 32 guns against 
67 on shore, but their guns were much more powerful. The squadron 
came up the Sound on a flood tide, the leading ship being hampered 
by a torpedo-catching structure fastened to its bows. The intended 
formation, line ahead 100 yards apart, was not kept with any precision. 
The orders were rather vague, Fort Sumter was selected as the principal 
objective. Anchoring does not appear to have been originally intended, 
but had to be adopted to avoid collisions. The ranges varied from 500 
to 2000 yards. After three-quarters-of-an-hours’ bombardment the 
ships drew off, five disabled and one in a sinking condition. One gun 
in the forts was disabled. Obstructions kept the ships from reaching 
their stations. The ships fired 139 shots, the fortress 2229. Failure 
was due to (1) insufficient armament on the ships to cope with the 
fortress ; (2) obstructions, and the dread of them; (3) lack of precon¬ 
ceived plans. 
(III.) Forcing a Channel .—We have several instances of this, especi- Obiigado. 
ally during the American Civil War. Passages were forced successfully 
by Duckworth in the Dardanelles, 1809; at Obiigado and San Lorenzo 
in 1845 ; at New Orleans, Vicksburg, and Mobile in 1862-3. In¬ 
stances of failure are the Peiho Fiver, 1859, Port Hudson, 1862. 
At Obiigado conquest as well as passage was desired. Instead of 
making a combined attack at once, bombardment was resorted to by 
the ships, which suffered heavy loss. The passage was forced, and 
subsequently the forts were taken by landing parties without difficulty. 
At San Lorenzo the moral effect of mortar fire from the opposite sanLorenzo. 
kept down the fire of the forts. A number of merchant ships convoyed 
by men-of-war got past with a loss of four, which ran ashore. 
Conquest being desired, as well as passage, at New Orleans, six days New Orleans 
were spent in mortar bombardment*. Then a passage was cleared 
through the obstacles, and the ships went through by night, bombard¬ 
ing as they went. One corvette was rammed by an enemy’s ship. 
At Vicksburg the forts were impregnable, and extended for three Vicksburg, 
miles. The river doubles under the guns of the fortress. Farragut, 
