COMMENDED ESSAY, 1893 . 
399 
delay, waiting for the French fleet to disperse, the expedition sailed. 
Troops, stores, and ships 5 guns were landed, and the heavy ships sent 
home. At the end of two months the shore batteries were completed, 
and the remaining ships ran up the Sound to create a diversion. The 
troops were not in sufficient force to completely invest the fortress on 
the land side, but reinforcements arrived, and this was done. The 
third parallel was completed three months after the start, and a few 
days after the fortress capitulated. 
In 1863 the troops were landed on Folly Island, and erected bat¬ 
teries on the north side. The monitors co-operated on the flank of 
the shore batteries, and after four hours 5 bombardment the outworks 
were silenced. The troops then advanced on Fort Wagner, the 
monitors searching the ground in front and covering the advance. 
The ships engaged Wagner with little result; a night assault was then 
made by the troops, but repulsed. Next day more batteries were 
thrown up, and both these and the ships engaged Wagner. Batteries 
were also erected to play on Forts Johnstone and Sumter. The latter, 
taken in rear, scarcely replied, and in three days all the guns on the 
north-west face (which was not open to the ships 5 fire) were disabled. 
A month after the commencement of the attack the port was in the 
Confederates 5 hands, and Charleston was evacuated six months later 
owing to Sherman 5 s operations in rear of the town. 
Banda Neira is a typical case of a successful landing. The defences Banda Neira 
consisted of 12 batteries (one with 52 guns) and 1500 men. The 
attacking force, three frigates, 120 troops, and two field guns. The 
landing took place at night; a tropical rain squall enabling it to be 
carried out just by one of the batteries, which was taken, without a 
shot, by a rush from the rear. The remaining works then gave in. 
Beyrout, twice bombarded without success, was evacuated in con- Beyrout. 
sequence of movements of troops in rear. Sidon was also taken by 
combined attack. 
At Sevastopol the ships took little part in the attack, and their action Sevastopol, 
cannot be said to have affected the issue in any way. They engaged 
the forts as “ an assistance and diversion to a bombardment on the 
land side. 55 The forts could not be approached closely, and the result 
of a bombardment, at anchor, of three hours, was three guns dis¬ 
mounted and 35 men killed. The ranges were 1600-3000 yards, and 
the Telegraph Battery (an earthwork 100 feet high) harassed the ships 
so much that they had to desist, the battery suffering no loss. 
Kinburn was taken by a combined attack, mortar boats and floating xinburn. 
batteries being used. 
The fall of Sfax was due to bombardment, followed up by troops, sfa*. 
The ships fired 2002 projectiles, at ranges 1500-7000 yards, with little 
result. 
The attack on Fort Fisher is full of instruction. The futility of an Fort Fisher, 
explosion vessel having been proved, the ships bombarded, opposing 
about 500 guns to about 50 on shore. 2000 men were then landed on 
the beach five miles to the north, but on advancing the General pro¬ 
nounced the fort intact for defensive purposes and retired. The Naval 
Secretary then issued clear orders as to the conduct of the attack. A 
