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THE VALUE OP MOBILITY POR FIELD ARTILLERY. 
the 17th and 18th Centuries were tempted to discard the tactics on 
which they had hitherto relied, and which were their special character¬ 
istic, and sought aid also from powder and shot. Thus it was that The 
Great Frederick found his cavalry when he came to the throne halting 
to fire a volley ere they delivered their charge, and it required all the 
strength of character of a man exceptionally strong-willed to stamp 
the heresy out. But although Frederick appreciated, as every military 
genius has done before his time and since, the fact that mobility is 
essential to success in war, he found he could not dispense with fire 
effect even with his cavalry, and thus, curiously enough, it was that guns 
in Europe, in order to supplement the efforts of the horseman, became 
endowed as it were with a new life. From the new powers of move¬ 
ment that were given them a whole train of results, each foreshadowing 
some modern development of their tactics, was produced. Guns that 
could move could be combined together, could be brought rapidly 
forward to deal a decisive blow, or could be carried from one part of 
the field of battle to another. It was mobility in fact, rather than 
improved shooting powers, which first raised artillery from the position 
it once occupied as a mere appendage to the infantry, into the status 
and position of an arm capable (although it is not intended to and does 
not desire to use its powers) of independent action. 
Artillery officers, remembering, perhaps, how much their arm had 
been indebted to mobility in the past, came 20 years ago to over¬ 
estimate its importance, or rather to underrate that of fire. Then a 
re-action.set in. We were taught that the whole duty of artillery was 
to hit, hit, hit. And now we have been reminded very forcibly that 
we must concentrate, concentrate, concentrate. With so much dogma 
flying about, I feel diffident in making any assertions, but I will 
venture to add as a corollary to both these postulates that guns must 
move also, otherwise they may find themselves in a position from 
which, perhaps, their hitting, if they survive long enough to find the 
range, may be of little avail, and their concentration will be that of an 
unwieldy mass. Accuracy without concentration is, in fact, of no 
value, concentration of fire means combination of batteries, and com¬ 
bination demands mobility. In other words, tactical considerations 
must form the foundations for technical excellence. 
Napoleon, who destroyed his earlier opponents chiefly by the rapidity 
of his movements, in his later campaigns relied much on his artillery. 
He valued fire effect so greatly that some of his maxims in war might 
appear the utterances of an enthusiastic musketry or gunnery instructor 
of to-day. (C Fire effect is everything, all the rest is nothing.” “ Vic¬ 
tory will be his who understands how to bring a great mass of guns 
into action unexpectedly.” Are not these almost the very precepts we 
hear round us in the mouths of many to-day ? 
A combination of mobility and of fire was to be looked for from 
artillery. The most essential characteristics of Napoleon’s tactics 
might, therefore, be found united in one arm, and, if we study what 
was his greatest artillery battle, we shall find a splendid illustration of 
how he turned to account the arm, all the powers of which he had 
done so much to develop. Nor need we hesitate to discuss the action 
