THE VALUE OF MOBILITY FOR FIE’LD ARTILLERY. 
445 
within effective rifle range of the guns. For help in such situations 
they must look to an adequate force of riflemen on their own side, so 
posted as to prevent the creeping sharpshooter from attaining a 
dangerous proximity to them. All this is now universally recognised 
and understood. On the other hand, after the preparatory artillery 
action is over, and the infantry have moved forward, the artillery must 
also be ready to conform to their movements and advance more or less 
with them. We must now be prepared for more than long hours of 
collar work, since such an advance will often have to be very rapid and 
cannot always be confined to roads or paths. Rough or highly cul¬ 
tivated ground may have to be crossed, and the detachments, in the 
case of Field Batteries, will almost always have to be mounted on the 
carriages. Again, the configuration of the ground will very seldom 
allow of guns remaining in action behind advancing infantry, nor 
would such tactics be desirable, if its safety and staunchness are not 
to be compromised. For men have a nervous dread of shells flying 
ovei* their heads from behind. 
The guns, therefore, will have to keep pace with the tide of advance. 
But besides this general, and more or less deliberate, forward move¬ 
ment, occasions and opportunities may arise in future warfare as they 
have in the past, when artillery must be prepared to make short des¬ 
perate rushes, and, forgetting their vulnerability and their long range, 
stand shoulder to shoulder with their brethren of the infantry. The 
war of 1870 shows us many such instances, and nothing in it was 
more conspicuous than the devotion with which the German Artillery 
again and again moved up right into the thick of musketry fire when 
urgent necessity existed for the sacrifice almost always involved. 
However perfect a weapon the modern rifle may become, if both sides 
are equally, or almost equally, well armed, the attack will come to a 
standstill at certain points as before, and then without the intervention 
of some new power it may be found impossible to push forward. 
There are also critical moments during all engagements at which not 
to be able to press on is tantamount to a repulse, when a check to an 
hitherto almost continuous advance may alter the whole aspect of 
affairs, or even herald the advent of defeat. 
On such occasions it will be always necessary to bring artillery 
rapidly into action at decisive points to give support and confidence to 
a wavering infantry, or shake a stubborn foe. I need hardly remind 
you that it will also be necessary after a successful attack by the other 
arms to send artillery forward to secure the ground gained, to destroy 
obstacles to further progress, or harass the flying enemy. 
And in the event of a disaster artillery must be no less alert to cover 
the retreat. It must, in fact, never forget that its chief value is as an 
auxiliary, and that it is with the infantry that it must stand or fall. Thus, 
on the 6th of August, 1870, at that same battle of Spicheren we find 
Colonel von Rex, commanding the 82nd Brigade, particularly begging 
for the support of artillery to give more decisive effect to the successes 
already gained on the Spicheren plateau by the infantry, who, half 
exhausted, were with difficulty clinging to the ground they had cap¬ 
tured. In response to his cry for aid General von Billow ordered up 
