462 
ADJUNCTS OF DEFENCE. 
Material, apart from personnel, is expensive in peace and useless in war. 
How many trained and experienced officers can be spared for the mul¬ 
titudinous position-finding cells which would be required ? Even if it 
could be admitted that competent non-commissioned officers will be 
forthcoming, a powerful objection deeply rooted in unchanging human 
nature remains. The position of the Fort or Battery Commander is 
deprived of its first right. The work exists only for its fire effect. 
Failing that effect it is a mere futile excresence marring a coast line. 
A commander deprived of all responsibility in regard to the one war 
function of his command is surely placed in a pitiable position, which 
only the most cogent reasons can justify. If, on the other hand, he is 
taken out of his command and placed in a position of some security on 
the top of an adjacent hill—the position selected in action by Osman 
Digna—the moral result will be deplorable. The position of the com¬ 
mander of a tactical unit, in action, is with his men, whose energies he 
must stimulate, whose dangers he must share. 
Turning to the question of simplicity, the verdict depends upon 
tactical considerations. Some of the writing to which position-finding 
has given birth seems to show that simplicity in the actual working of 
coast defence has gone by the board. Hew titles have been freely 
mounted ; involved systems of commuication have been demanded 
entailing a maze of telephone and telegraph wires, and presenting the. 
fighting of a coast battery in a light calculated to appal the imagina¬ 
tion. All this lends itself readily to diagrammatic illustration. Has 
it the smallest value in war ? It is remarkable that, at a period when 
the idea of interfering with tactical units, once engaged, is losing 
ground, the coast battery should be threatened with the loss of all 
independence. The chain of responsibility—General Officer Com¬ 
manding, Section C.B.A., Battery Commander—is essential in peace 
where the object is preparation and the all-important element of time 
does not enter. It may be ruinous in war. The Battery Commander 
should know his work, his guns, his field of fire, as no one else can. 
His duty is clearly defined. Interference with his functions can only 
mean loss of time, with possible misunderstandings and confusion. 
His superior may be able to warn him to be on the alert, may reinforce 
him if his casualties are severe; but cannot hope to do more. Once 
engaged, he is, or ought to be, the best judge of the distribution of 
his fire. Unless this view, which has at least the sanction of ex¬ 
perience, is correct, the complications threatened by position-finding 
must be regarded with grave distrust. Circumstances may justify 
them. In the rule, they are fraught with danger. 
Of the many possible difficulties involved in the enormous electrical 
communications which any extended application of the system involves 
it is, perhaps, premature to speak. Those difficulties will not be 
adequately realised till such an application has been made and actually 
tried under service conditions. 
The above considerations seems to lead to the following as the limiting 
condition to the use of this valuable adjunct. Position-finding should 
never he employed where sights can he used , and ivhen accurate range-finding 
within effective fighting distances is possible. Ample scope remains for 
