550 
NOTE ON INFANTRY TACTICS. 
from an officer like himself, recognising the orders would wish that his 
text-book could have been less vague. 
The field movements in the Regulation do not come into the tactics: 
when we pass on to tactics we leave all drill behind us. The move¬ 
ments seem to have been put there in deference to old officers; but 
with only scant comprehension of why they like drill. They like drill 
because they know that drill makes discipline and discipline makes 
strength in battle; and they like drill because they believe that practice 
of a movement at home conduces to its better execution in battle. For 
the latter reason old officers would like to see in Regulation the field 
movements which will be used in attack. Drill for proper field move¬ 
ments of the battalion and brigade, and a more correct drill language 
than is given us, are necessary to the proper conduct in the field of 
any body of troops larger than the tactical unit. Troop leading is 
more easily learned from drill than from the study of principles and 
general rules. Principles are for the few, and drill is for the many. 
General rules are bad teachers: they may be only expositions of the 
knowledge of those who know. 
An officer under examination in tactics, being unable to answer a 
certain question, might yield to the temptation of saying he would act 
according to the circumstances of the case; and, if the insufficiency of 
that answer should seem to him to be too plain, he might add “ accord¬ 
ing to the nature of the fire of the enemy, whether artillery or infantry 
fire, according to the strength of the enemy, and according to the 
nature of the ground.” If he should make that sort of answer, he 
would bring in the nature of the ground : to cite the nature of the 
ground, without saying what would be done on this ground and what 
on that, is the surest sign of the mind not having been vexed by study 
of the question. The circumstances of cases will vary; but that is no 
reason for our not having a standard system of attack. It would be 
well for a commanding officer, who should not see anything better to 
do, to have a system and a drill to fall back upon; and an officer, who 
in battle shall be capable of seeing the best thing to do, will not be 
thwarted by that thing not being in Regulation. A standard system 
would not prevent thought : it would raise to its level, but not bring 
down to its level. But why should we want a different plan for differ¬ 
ent circumstances ? We know how infantry and artillery are armed; 
and we know that our object is to get close to the enemy with a suffi¬ 
cient number of men in a fit state to charge. It would not be in the 
standard plan to move in column where any fire could fall upon the 
column; so there is no reason why the plan should vary with the kind 
of fire of the enemy. How would the plan vary with the nature of the 
ground ? The plan would not vary: obstacles might impede, or for¬ 
bid, advance by a certain line ; neither a bank nor a made shelter- 
trench would alter the plan; if it should be necessary to attack an 
enemy having shelter for his firing line and cover for his supports, the 
attack would be followed by other Lines. How would the plan vary 
with the strength of the enemy ? Only in the number of Lines: an 
enemy, known to be weak, might be attacked with less than three Lines; 
if the enemy should prove to be strong, and it should still be meant to 
