NOTE ON INFANTRY TACTICS. 
551 
press the attack at that point, or if, the strength of the enemy being 
unknown, it should be determined to overcome all resistance at a selected 
point, the normal three Lines of attack would be supported by another 
Line or other Lines. 
The Regulation objection to there being a standard system is that, 
as orders in battle cannot be carried out precisely, authority must be 
delegated. The statements as to battle are true; but the objection is 
not valid. An answer to the objection, so far as it relates to the differ¬ 
ent circumstances of cases, has been submitted. So far as reference is 
made to the failure of high command on account of the fire of the 
enemy, the objection seems to mean that, because the brigadier must 
lose control over his attack, and commanding officers must in their 
turn lose control over their captains, it is better to train company 
officers in the knowledge that, when they shall find themselves closely 
engaged with the enemy, they will have no orders to help them, nor 
conformed habit of one particular drill, but only their own talent, and 
what they may call to mind of knowledge gained by study of the prin¬ 
ciples and general rules of Regulation. In reply to the objection thus 
’ interpreted we submit that we can formulate a system of attack which, 
after the first advance of the firing line, shall work automatically; that 
it is better not to try to correct mistakes in battle by sending orders to 
the front; and that the brigadier for some time after the launch of the 
attack, and commanding officers for a longer time, could command 
by correcting distance and direction, if they should think it right to 
intervene. We submit, moreover, that the inevitable failure of high 
command under close fire ought not to prevent our planning how to 
proceed until the failure shall come. According to the scheme which 
would work automatically, the brigadier, having pointed out the object¬ 
ive and ordered the advance, would follow the rear battalion, if all his 
brigade should be in the attack : if he should have one battalion left 
he would stay with it. The command would pass from the brigadier 
to the commanders of Lines, and from Line commanders to company 
commanders, as the Lines should near the enemy. The firing line 
would be pushed forward by reinforcement and pressure of support 
until the line should charge, or until the whole attack should swarm on 
the firing line, and they should charge, or lie down and wait for sup¬ 
port, or be driven back by a charge. It would not be difficult to 
formulate the scheme, and to frame the drill for it, provided that rear 
Lines should start at fair supporting distance—that is at a little less 
than half the distance given in Regulation—and that the depth of the 
First Line should never be more than 400 yards. In battle, the tempt¬ 
ation to send an order to an officer advancing against the enemy ought 
to be resisted to the utmost. A firing line advancing under destructive 
fire is directed by its officers, or by its bravest men, or makes blind 
rushes when the impulse comes from within or by reinforcement; and 
orders can be sent only at peril of the bearer being shot, and with little 
chance of any attention being paid to the order should it be delivered; 
but, if a firing line should go off too much to a flank, and the Line next 
in support should not be too near, the true direction might be recovered 
by neglecting the one flank and sending reinforcements to the other. 
