THE BOYAL ABTILLEBY INSTITUTION. 
143 
be succeeded by stretches of a lower kind of grass, and by extensive fields 
of rice cultivation. At Chapur we had to cross the Chumpamuttee river on 
rafts, and in the cool water of this river enjoyed a refreshing bathe, in spite 
of the presence therein of numerous gigantic alligators. 
The 4th February saw us in our old ground at Jogeegopah, across which 
a violent wind was blowing clouds of dust, which filled our tents and ren¬ 
dered writing or eating an exceedingly unpleasant occupation. The post 
brought us intelligence of Dewangiri having been attacked on the 29th 
January by a large force of Bhooteas, who, at about 3 a.m., had stolen 
past the pickets, sword in hand, and attacked the camp, killing and 
wounding many of the native servants who lay outside the tents, and cutting 
at the tents themselves; when expelled from the camp they kept up, from 
outside, a heavy fire of matchlocks which killed Lieut. Urquhart, of the 
Boyal Engineers, and 5 Sepoys, and wounded Lieut. Storey, of the 43rd 
Native Infantry, and 37 Sepoys. The attack had long been expected, and 
the enemy shewed great skill and courage in the way he passed the outlying 
pickets, and attacked the camp. Beinforcements had been sent towards this 
post, but had not arrived up to the 31st, on which date the enemy had 
erected a stockade in a position commanding Dewangiri, and from which 
the 43rd Native Infantry had been unable to dislodge them. 
A further reinforcement of two companies of the 12th Begiment, Native 
Infantry, was sent from our column, besides cavalry; but on the 7th 
February we heard that Dewangiri had been abandoned and the guns which 
had been attached to the right column lost in the retreat. The reasons 
assigned for abandoning this post were the difficulty of obtaining water, the 
want of communication, and the indefensible nature of the post. 
It is well to mention here that the guns abandoned were not Armstrong guns, 
as the English periodicals have so sturdily insisted; they were not, though 
employed in the mountains, guns intended for that kind of warfare, being 
heavier than any of that nature, viz. of 3 cwt.; they were, I believe, identical 
with those employed for boat service in the Boyal Navy. Their great weight 
rendered it a matter of impossibility that they could be moved on mules* 
or ponies* backs, or carried by a few men when slung on poles, they were 
therefore entirely unsuited for mountain warfare; the fact of their being 
obliged to be carried on elephants, at once rendered them an impediment 
to a rapidly advancing or retreating force; even broad-shouldered powerful 
English gunners could with difficulty have carried these pieces of ordnance, 
and the weakly light-framed Eurasian was quite unequal to the task. 
From the very steady behaviour of the detachment belonging to these two 
guns,—who carried away wounded men abandoned by their own comrades, 
and who, even when deserted by the escort of the 43rd Native Infantry, 
given to them as a protection, still kept their discipline,—there can be no 
doubt that had the guns been of a nature to admit of being carried by hand, 
they would not have been lost. As an artillery officer I feel bound to make 
this statement, in order that this disaster may be attributed to its proper 
cause. 
As it was not unlikely that Bissen Singh had been attacked, our chief. 
Colonel Bichardson, determined to communicate with that garrison, more 
especially as we had heard no news from them, and our little force, now only 
consisting of about 300 men, returned, via Chapur and Faquaragoan, to 
