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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
cooking of the evening meal; that battles were sanguinary almost beyond 
precedent; and that arms, highly destructive from their rapidity of fire, were 
largely used. It may be inferred, that the two former of these circumstances 
were, in great measure, the results of the latter, and in this respect, their 
consideration bears upon the matter under discussion. 
On the third of July 1866, the day of the decisive battle of Koniggratz 
in Bohemia, were for the first time presented to view, two European armies 
of vast proportions, fully and about equally armed with modem rifled 
artillery. This occasion may therefore be cited as the first, on which the 
action of this nature of ordnance has been developed, under conditions 
favourable to a consideration of it, uninfluenced by incidental circumstances. 
The battle of Custozza, fought in the jaws of the Venetian quadrilateral, 
although the opening conflict of the war, preceding that on the upper Elbe 
in point of time, is unworthy to hold this place, from its inferiority as a 
battle, both in design and in the numbers engaged, and from the imperfect 
information given to the world of its details. 
It may be interesting, so far as our information extends, to consider the 
dispositions of the artillery in the battle of Koniggratz, and the duties which 
were imposed upon it. 
Erom the letters of military correspondents, it is gathered, that the Prussian 
army was equipped with about 700 field guns for the attack, and the 
Austrian army with an almost equal number for the defence. Probably 
nearly the whole of this enormous force was brought into action during the 
day. As regards the amount of judgment displayed in the disposition of 
the Austrian batteries, the accounts are somewhat conflicting, but they were 
posted, with more or less skill, to sweep the approaches to a position, which, 
from its salient contour, -was not the most favourable, as regards the defenders, 
to a concentrated artillery fire. This Austrian disadvantage w r as evidently 
an advantage for the Prussians, whose line, overlapping the position, rendered 
a converging and concentrated fire a natural condition. There is reason to 
believe, the ground was not wanting in natural obstacles, and such features 
as facilitate a stout defence, and to these, so far as the time at the disposal 
of the Austrian engineers would permit, were added lines of breastwork and 
batteries to protect the guns, and redoubts for the strengthening of points 
held by the infantry. Whatever the strength of the profile of these entrench¬ 
ments, they added no doubt greatly to the security of the position, and to 
the difficulty of the task to be performed by the Prussians in their direct 
attack. The Prussian guns when engaged, were necessarily in a great 
measure exposed, having to seek the enemy on his own ground, and open 
fire from points, of which the ranges had previously been ascertained by the 
Austrian artillerymen. This latter disadvantage was gradually neutralized, 
owing to the power usually possessed by an assailant, of placing a superior 
number of pieces in battery, for a concentrated fire upon successive points of 
a defender's position. The advantage of cover on the side of the Austrians 
was not so easily overcome, and to this probably may, in a great measure, be 
attributed the fact, that the Prussians failed to dislodge their adversary from 
the centre and left of his line, until the outflanking of the right wing 
rendered the position untenable. Thus much for the manner in which the 
artillery was disposed on the field of Koniggratz. This has been chiefly 
referable to the Austrian army, which was deliberately posted for the defence 
