THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
307 
of the ground. The dispositions of the assailants were, as a matter of 
course, regulated by the plan for the defence, and were undeveloped until 
the hour of battle arrived. 
The active duties performed by the artillery are, on the other hand, to be 
gathered principally from a consideration of the operations of the Prussians. 
These appear to have consisted, mainly, of a series of bombardments, directed 
either against villages entrenched and barricaded, and forming a line of strong 
advanced points which must be carried to ensure success, or against woods 
crowded with infantry, who, secure under cover of their position, could not 
be dislodged otherwise than by artillery fire, and even successfully defied the 
superior fire of the Prussian needle-gun. The results are evidences both of 
the effectiveness of the fire, on this occasion, and of the nature of the projectile 
employed. In rapid succession, the villages burst into flame, and by their 
conflagration assisted the enemy's shell in the expulsion of the defenders, and, 
that the recesses of the woods were successfully searched, was but too faithfully 
shewn by the groups of dead, that lay to mark the spots where the shells ex¬ 
ploded. Notwithstanding that this nature of operation is but a reproduction 
of the more or less common incidents of former wars, we cannot but observe 
its prevalence during the battle of Koniggratz, and are led to enquire whether 
the case is exceptional, or may be taken as an exponent of what is in future 
to be expected. Making due allowance for the varieties of country, in which 
campaigns may be conducted, this battle may possibly be taken as a type 
of battles yet unfought, so far as regards the tendency of the commander of 
an army acting on the defensive to create obstacles, and place his troops 
under cover, avoiding all unnecessary display in the formation of his line of 
battle. The class of operations considered above, are the direct results of 
this tendency, and their frequency will depend upon the extent to which it 
may prevail. 
The causes which increase the value of cover, namely, the increased precision 
and destructiveness of artillery and small arms, operate equally for both 
parties engaged in war, and accordingly, the tendency in question is 
manifested on the side of the attack, by the eagerness with which every 
fold and hollow of ground is taken advantage of, for the concealment and 
security of tactical movements. The dispositions and combinations of troops 
preceding the assault, are arranged and matured as far as possible out of 
sight, until the moment of attack arrives, when the columns, issuing from 
their shelter, move with the greatest rapidity across the intervening open 
space, to close with the enemy. 
Regarding the Austro-Prussian campaign as a whole, it has by some been 
considered, that the direct results of the artillery operations were not com¬ 
mensurate with the force of ordnance employed, and comparisons have in 
consequence been made, between the efficiency of rifled and smooth-bored 
guns, not unfavourable to the latter. This may have arisen from imperfect 
training, or inferior materiel , or from both causes combined, or lastly, it is 
not impossible, that the standard of excellence for rifled ordnance, which has 
been established on the practice ground, will continue to cause disappointment 
on service, from the difficulty of attaining it under the circumstances of actual 
warfare. 
In the service of the Prussian and Austrian guns in the battle of 
Koniggratz, there is one feature however, worthy of notice, common to both 
