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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
armies, namely the high degree of rapidity with which the fire was delivered. 
Without this rapidity on the part of the Prussians, the Austrian shell, 
striking and bursting among their batteries as they came successively into 
action, disabling carriages, and dismounting guns, might have crushed the 
attack, and doubtless, the rapid and well sustained fire from the entrenched 
batteries, contributed largely towards arresting the progress of the Prussian 
line of battle. 
It will readily be seen that the introduction of breech-loading rifled small 
arms will tend to the same practical result, namely to make cover of every 
description of incalculable value whenever attainable, whether in the pitched 
battle on a chosen position, in the accidental combat, or in the close fighting 
of the mountain defile or village street. The late campaign in Bohemia has 
taught practically, what no doubt was before theoretically known, that the 
great superiority of the breech-loading small arm, lies in its rapidity of shooting, 
and that cover alone enables the muzzle-loader to stand before its continuous 
fire. This is abundantly exemplified by the result of every combat, in which 
the Austrian and Prussian infantry were opposed to each other with an equal 
front and without cover, in the streets of the Bohemian towns. Each day 
told the same tale of a sanguinary fight, and a town lost to Austria. On the 
other hand, the Austrians, ensconced in the woods of Sadowa, successfully 
stayed the tide of the Prussian advance, until the fatally decisive moment of 
the day arrived. Then again, the needle-gun had a fair field, and insured 
to a brilliant manoeuvre the success it deserved. The Prussian column 
forcing itself wedge-like into the right of the position, was enabled to make 
good its ground, and develop its front, from the impotence of the Austrian 
battalions to subdue the breech-loaders by their feeble fire, or close with an 
enemy thus armed, in the open field. Had the Austrians, now twice the 
victims to exemplify the danger of delay in the adaptation of science to war, 
been similarly armed, although victory might have differently inclined, the 
importance of cover would not have been diminished. 
When the equilibrium of armies, which has been so rudely disturbed by 
the Prussian needle-gun, shall have been restored, by the general adoption 
of the breech-loading principle in small arms, the acquisition of cover will 
be of increased value, from the deadly nature of these weapons at close 
quarters. Where numbers are equally balanced, its possession may often 
confer an overwhelming advantage, and in the case of a numerical inferiority, 
it may more than ever be relied upon to restore equality. 
If the foregoing considerations and deductions are justifiable, it will appear, 
that the common effect of the general use of rifled arms of great precision 
and rapidity of fire, will be to make the acquisition and creation of cover, 
both natural and artificial, one of the first considerations in campaigning. 
This may be carried to such an extent, that the ordinary work for the 
attacking artillery may be to engage batteries entrenched; to dislodge 
infantry posted under cover; to overthrow obstacles; to demolish the 
defences of villages and other posts, more or less fortified; and to clear 
woods and thickets; while the ordinary work of the artillery acting on the 
defensive may be to receive and keep down the fire of batteries projecting 
common shell with great rapidity; to check the advance of troops moving rapidly 
to the attack; and to disturb the evolutions of cavalry and artillery when 
visible* On the other hand, the exceptional work for artillery in the field 
