THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
357 
Invasion of Bohemia. 
It remained for a few days, and only for a few days, doubtful where the 
next blow would be struck, and from whom it would proceed. The Austrians 
had proclaimed so loudly their intention of marching on Berlin, and they 
were commanded by a general whose character stood so high for daring, that 
the Prussian citizens trembled for their capital. Their suspense was soon 
over. On the 23rd June those Prussian corps which stood on the borders 
of Saxony and Silesia crossed the northern frontier of Bohemia, and on the 
26th the rest of the army, (which was on the north eastern frontier of Bohemia), 
started to unite with them. 
The troops thus put in motion consisted of three armies under separate 
commanders; the whole acting under orders nominally given by the King, 
and practically emanating from his chief military adviser Lieut.-General 
Baron von Moltke. The army bolding the right of the Prussian front, was 
the one that had occupied Saxony, it was called the Elbe Army and was com¬ 
manded (as I before mentioned) by General Herwarth von Bittenfeld. Its line of 
route was from Dresden through Bumburg towards Munchengratz. Its 
force was about 40,000 men and 135 guns. (See Plan 1). 
The army in the centre, called the 1st Army, was commanded by Prince 
Prederick Charles, and numbered 81,000 men and 270 guns. It crossed the 
frontier by two roads, at Seidenberg and Zittau; united at Keichenberg, and 
then moved on Turnau nearly parallel to the Elbe Army, at about ten 
miles from it. After reaching the river Iser the Elbe Army and the 1st Army 
co-operated together, the former always occupying the right flank. 
The army on the left, called the 2nd Army, was separated by a wide 
interval from the centre: it was commanded by the Crown Prince, and 
contained 100,000 men and 360 guns. The roads by which it entered 
Bohemia lead from Landshut, Braunau, and Glatz in a nearly westerly 
direction. It had a more hazardous task to perform than the 1st Army, 
for it had a greater extent of mountainous country to traverse, and its route 
lay nearer to the Austrian head-quarters.* There was too a line of railway 
on the Austrian side, (promising facilities for bringing up troops,) which, if 
the defiles were guarded, and the columns were checked for a single day 
might prove fatal to the scheme. 
Everything had been carefully and intelligently prepared for the invasion 
even to the laying down of electric telegraph lines for the different columns 
to communicate their progress to head-quarters.f But the general feeling 
of the Prussians was that they were venturing on a path full of danger. 
* As the first army had the advantage of the presence of the “ Times ” military correspondent, 
who described its operations in an admirable manner, whilst the movements and encounters of the 
second army were only made known by brief telegrams and occasional notices, the part which it 
had to play was not sufficiently appreciated or understood in this country. In Prussia, on the other 
hand, the first army considered itself underrated, and a pamphlet has been published to vindicate its 
share in the hardships and glories of the campaign. (See also note B, p. 380). 
f Some account of these field telegraph arrangments will be found in the “Time§” pf 3rd and 
7th July, 1866. 
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