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MINUTES OF PKOCEEDINGS OF 
The Austrians on the other hand loudly declared their confidence of success. 
What could the needle gun do against the bayonet as they would use it; 
and where was the general who could compete with Benedek ? There was 
some little wonder first that the Prussians had been permitted to seize 
Saxony, and next that they were allowed to decend safely into Bohemia, but 
the public journals imputed this to a deep laid scheme, and, that the invaders 
would be surely and thoroughly overthrown, was trustfully predicted by every 
newspaper at Vienna.* 
The actual disposition of the Austrian troops when the invasion took place 
was as follows. Benedek had six army corpsf and two divisions of heavy 
cavalry under his orders; in addition to which there was the Saxon army, 
about 20,000 strong, come to fight under the Austrian flag. This army and 
the first Austrian Corps were at the Iser, the river which flows past Munchen- 
gratz; on them it would devolve to check Prince Prederick Charles and 
General Herwarth. The rest of the Austrian Corps had j*ust been collected 
on the Upper Elbe and stood as shewn on Plan 2 thus:—6th at Neustadt, 
the 8th at Jaromirz; the 2nd at Josephstadt, the 4th at Koniginhof; and 
the 10th at Arnau. These five corps therefore stood directly in front of 
the 2nd Prussian Army, and threatened to meet and overpower it before it 
was clear of the mountain defiles. (See Plan 2.) 
Putting the troops on each side in numbers, it appears that towards the 
Iser there were about 55,000 Austrians against 120,000 Prussians; whereas 
on the Upper Elbe there were 160,000 Austrians against 100,000 Prussians ; 
now the Austrians on the river Iser might retire before the superior force 
of Prussians (if they did it slowly and steadily) without serious disadvantage 
to their further prospects, but the 2nd Prussian Army must either force 
its way against the five corps opposed to it, or see the object of the campaign 
frustrated. If this army were defeated, and driven back, the main strength 
of the Austrians would be quickly moved towards the Iser, where Prince 
Erederick Charles would have to accept battle, when out-numbered, or retire 
out of Bohemia. Any one who could have been aware of all these cir¬ 
cumstances would have pronounced that on the whole the chances of success 
were against the Prussians, and, if they had been defeated here, nobody 
would have found fault with the passes having been left open to them; 
superficial writers would probably have approved it, and regarded it as a 
stratagem to tempt the invaders to their ultimate destruction. 
To secure a superiority of numbers at a decisive point is one of the chief 
objects of military leadership ; yet it often happens that the more numerous 
side is worsted, and a fresh example of such a result was furnished here. 
In every collision that occurred between the Austrians and the 2nd Army, 
the final advantage rested with the Prussians. Indeed in every encounter 
but one, the success was immediate and decisive; in many it was attended 
with symptoms of panic in the Austrian ranks. 
The 2nd Prussian Army consisted of four corps, the 1st, the 5 th, the 6 th, and 
the Guards Corps. Of these the 6th had been sent to make a demonstration 
in a southerly direction,—to divert the Austrians from the true point of 
* See “Times,” 14th July, 1866. 
f For the composition of the Army Corps on each side see note A, p. 379. 
