860 
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF 
Battle of Koniggratz. 
Besides tile losses which the Austrians had suffered in killed and wounded 
their ranks were weakened by the capture of prisoners to the extraordinary 
number of 18,000 men, and their artillery was diminished by 24 guns. 
The infantry was seized with a fear of the needle gun, and the confidence 
of the army began to be shaken. . Their position might be retrieved, it is 
true, by a single great victory, but even Benedek felt that the moment was 
inopportune for committing the safety of the empire to the chance of a 
general action. He recommended to the government that the army should 
retreat towards Olmutz, but the Emperor's advisers did not give their 
sanction to the measure.* 
It was fully expected by the Prussian staff officers that Benedek would at 
least retire to the left bank of the Elbe below the fortress of Josefstadt, and 
it was intended that the army should have a short rest before it made any 
further advance. The King had now come to take command in person, and 
his head quarters were at Gits chin. Prince Erederick Charles visited him 
there on the 2nd July, and quitted it with the understanding that his troops 
would remain, for one day at least, in their actual quarters. But, on 
reaching Kamenitz, his own head quarters (see Plan 2), at about half-past 
four in the afternoon, he received intelligence, gained by reconnoitring 
parties, that the Austrians were in great force on the right bank of the Elbe, 
occupying a tract of ground between it and a brook called the Bistritz. 
Their outposts were holding villages beyond the brook, and were within nine 
miles of Kamenitz. 
It was impossible to judge whether Benedek had taken up this position as 
preliminary to a violent onslaught on the 1st Army,—in the chance of 
crushing it before the 2nd Army could arrive on the field,—or whether it 
was selected with the view of receiving there the Prussian attack. In either 
case the proper preliminary measures to be taken by Prince Erederick Charles 
were the same, and they were ordered and carried out in the most prompt 
and effective manner. The Prince directed the divisions of his own army 
to take such positions under cover of the ridge facing the Bistritz, and 
commanding the road towards Sadowa, as would enable them to co-operate 
effectively if they were attacked, and would likewise facilitate their moving 
against Benedek's position if events rendered it desirable to do so. Wishing 
to tempt Benedek to advance upon him, his troops were so skilfully posted 
that Austrian reconnoitring parties would have failed to discover the dis¬ 
positions of the force, even if they had detected its presence. 
He also showed his aptitude for high command by planning an auxiliary 
manoeuvre.t tie sent instructions to the Elbe Army on his right to move 
upon Nechanitz (a village on the Bistritz), five miles below Sadowa and 
thence to operate upon the Austrian flank; which would be equally 
* See “ Times,” 3rd August. The fact is there very positively asserted. 
f See however note C, p. 381; a later account attributes all the credit of the arrangements to a 
different quarter. 
