THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
361 
practicable whether Benedek crossed the Bistritz at Sadowa, or remained on 
the defensive behind it. 
To the 2nd Army, over whose movements he had no control, Prince 
Prederick despatched a messenger begging the Crown Prince to send at 
least one corps against the Austrian right; and to the King's head quarters 
he sent his own chief of the staff to report upon the whole state of affairs. 
The King approved of these measures, and supported them by forwarding 
a positive order to the Crown Prince to advance,—not merely a single corps, 
but,—his whole army : at the same time he enjoined Prince Prederick 
Charles to be cautious about provoking an engagement next morning, lest, 
if it began early, the co-operation of the 2nd Army might be precariously 
late. 
Thus it was a matter of uncertainty in the Prussian Army on the morning 
of the 3rd July, whether the battle would be on the near or the far side of 
the Bistritz. Nor was there any plan of action, beyond the general intention 
that the 1st Army should bear the brunt, trusting to diversions being made, 
sooner or later, on each flank. None of the staff had any special acquaintance 
with the ground, and the enemy's position had not been reconnoitred except 
by the parties who brought the first news of an army being there. On the 
other hand it was to be supposed that Benedek had all his forces well in 
hand,—that he knew the ground,—that he had adapted his plan (whether 
for attack or defence) to the circumstances of it,—and that he would be able 
to avail himself of any advantage which the natural features afforded. Por 
the Prussian generals to court, rather than to shun, a battle under such 
circumstances, was a peculiarly bold resolution. 
The divisions of Prince Prederick Charles's Army moved, in the evening 
and night of the 2nd July, to the places appointed, and waited there till 
half-past five on the following morning; finding then that there were 
no indications of an attack from the enemy, they moved nearer to the 
Bistritz. The Austrian outposts had been withdrawn beyond the brook, 
and it now appeared doubtful whether anything more than a rear guard 
remained in position; but as the Prussians approached the stream a heavy 
artillery fire was opened upon them, and showed that the rising ground 
beyond was held in great strength. 
Benedek had in fact assembled there all his available troops, and they 
may be reckoned, after due allowance for previous losses, at 180,000 men 
and 600 guns. Their front was towards the north-west; all the troops 
faced the Bistritz; none were put in line towards the north-east, in which 
direction the Crown Prince's Army lay; but the length of front Was so short 
compared with the number of men on the ground, that plenty could be 
spared to fight on the flanks without any risk of weakening the centre. 
The ground was of an irregular undulating character, ridges and valleys 
alternating with one another, and presenting no marked features to catch the 
eye, except that to a spectator in the Prussian 1st Army, a knoll near Chlum 
appeared as the highest point of the line. A good straight road leading to 
Koniggratz crossed the Bistritz at Sadowa and passed near the knolh 
Two miles above Sadowa the Bistritz made a sudden bend, the line of its 
course tending to the north-west instead of the north-east; and opposite to 
this bend, near Horenowes, was the Austrian right flank, thence the line 
ran parallel to the Bistritz for about six miles; as far as Prim, with out- 
