362 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
posts occupying the village of Nechanitz. There were bridges at several 
places over the Bistritz, but it was not easily passable elsewhere, and the 
ground near it was swampy. (See Plan 3). 
The most important considerations bearing on the Prussian arrangements 
relate (1) to the distances which the various corps of the Crown Prince's 
Army would have to march before they could render any active help to 
Prince Prederick Charles; and (2) to the relative numbers which might be 
brought into action, on the Prussian and Austrian side, before any of those 
corps arrived. 
The nearest troops of the Crown Prince's Army were one division (half 
the corps) of the guard at Koniginhof; the other division was at Bettendorf, 
two and a half miles further. Prom Koniginhof to Horenowes is nine miles 
in a straight line, and upwards of ten by road. A single regiment might 
march this distance in three and a half hours; for a column of 12,000 men, with 
a cavalry and artillery (which would occupy three miles length on the road) 
an additional hour must be allowed. Some time must also be spent in 
examining the ground and preparing for action when the enemy's position 
became visible, so that five hours would probably elapse, after the nearest 
division began its march, before it could take any serious share in the day's 
work. Of the other corps under the Crown Prince, the 6th was near 
Gradlitz, and had about the same length of march before it as the Guard 
Corps, but would probably not get orders soon enough to start so early. 
The 1st Corps, at Prausnitz and Arnau was further off. The 5th Corps 
was to act as a reserve, not entering into action without special orders. 
The staff officer sent with Prince Prederick Charles's message reached the 
Crown Prince at one in the morning, and rejoined with his report at four; 
consequently there was no doubt about the application for assistance having 
arrived.* The King's orders would necessarily be later, for they were not 
despatched from Gitschin till midnight; everything considered, it would 
appear that a division might be on the ground, possibly by nine,—reasonably 
by ten o'clock, and further troops in regular succession. 
Turn now to the Austrian side. It is to be noted that in July it becomes 
light between three and four, so that if Benedek had it in view to throw the 
weight of his force upon the army nearest to him, and seized the earliest dawn 
for opening the battle, there would be several hours during which he would 
enjoy all the advantage that numbers could give him : Prince Prederick 
Charles had only 75,000 men available for immediate use, and 35,000 sent 
round by Nechanitz; Benedek's total force was 180,000. 
You will observe then that the Battle of Koniggratz was begun under 
exceptional circumstances, and which may be thus recapitulated. The Prussian 
armies, which entered Bohemia by widely separated routes, had effected a 
junction with one another, so far as free direct communication went, but 
were not yet sufficiently concentrated to ensure their co-operation against a 
very sudden attack. The Prussian staff had calculated, not unreasonably, 
that Benedek would not offer battle on that side of the Elbe; finding him 
unexpectedly posted in an advanced and threatening position they boldly 
prepared to fight, in spite of the risk of placing part of their army in a 
hazardous position. 
* More accurate information about the co-operation of the 2nd Army will be found in note C, 
p.381* 
