THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
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with more rapidity. The influence which alterations of this kind exercise is 
sometimes so small that it escapes general attention, or becomes a matter of 
dispute among writers. In this instance there is no doubt that the Prussian 
gun did make their infantry fire far more deadly than that of the enemy, 
and that partly in this direct manner, partly in an indirect manner, it had a 
very powerful influence on the Bohemian campaign. 
The first few combats on that scene sufficed to establish its superiority. 
It appeared that the needle breech-loader could, as anticipated, be fired nearly 
three times whilst the muzzle-loader could be fired once; and that when bodies 
of infantry were at close quarters, firing rapidly without accurate aim being 
needful, one Prussian soldier was, for the moment, on a par with more than 
one of his opponents. The remedy which Benedek had recommended,—the 
use of the bayonet,—proved (as might have been expected) ill-judged and 
ineffective, and demoralization soon began to show itself in the Austrian ranks. 
After the battle of Koniggratz, it had reached such a point that during the 
march from Olmutz, a mere verbal alarm of the Prussians being at hand 
caused the infantry to take to flight, many throwing down their arms, under 
Benedek's own eye. Indignant at such conduct he threatened to have every 
man shot who had thus discarded his weapon; “ but,” says the military 
correspondent of the “Times,”* (who was present on the occasion) “the 
number of victims would have borne a fair proportion to the executioners.” 
A gun that could be the means, directly or indirectly, of producing such an 
unreadiness to fight, may fairly be said to have realized the most sanguine 
hopes of its introducer. 
The Prussians had not only taken the lead in adopting a quick firing gun, 
but they had adapted the formation and manoeuvres of their infantry to it, 
and they had foreseen with a remarkable precision what an enemy exposed to 
their fire would have recourse to. An official book of instructions for the 
army,f printed at Berlin in 1861 (six years ago), says that an adversary 
armed with such a rifle as the Minie, “ when engaged with the needle gun 
will seek safety in the bayonet-encounter.” Benedek's address to his army 
on taking command of it contains the following passage. “The enemy have 
for some time vaunted the excellence of their fire-arms, but, soldiers, I 
do not think that will be of much avail to them. We will give them no 
time, but we will attack them with the bayonet and with crossed muskets. 
When, with God's help we shall have beaten our enemies and compelled them 
to retreat, we will pursue them without intermission.”{ I think it is 
seldom that a prediction of any kind has been fulfilled with such literal 
accuracy as in this instance. 
With a gun possessing certain peculiar advantages, with a system of tactics 
adapted to the gun, and an enemy taking the very course which they were 
best prepared to counteract, there can be little doubt that the Prussians 
would have been victorious, even if the two armies had been equally matched 
in other respects, but if we were to assume without further enquiry that all 
their success was due to this one cause, we should not do justice to their 
proficiency in the art of war; and if we were to attribute the disorder in the 
* 4th Aug., 1866. 
f “ Allerhochste Verordnungen iiber die grosseren Truppeniibungen.” 
£ See “Times,” 22nd June, 1866. 
