874 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
the result was safe. In the Italian campaign of 1859 the Austrians suffered 
a series of defeats; and on particular occasions when they had superior 
numbers on the spot they effected nothing. This also was attributed to a 
want of quickness as compared with the French. To use an Austrian 
officer's own expression, in a conversation with myself, they stood up to be 
shot at. 
There seem, then, to have been three influences at work to produce that 
disorder in the Austrian ranks which soon made it hopeless to take them 
into action. The needle gun, political disaffection, combined with a want 
of national unity, and a certain inaptness for infantry firing. Of these the 
needle gun may fairly be put first, not only because of its importance, but 
because it may have been the means of bringing into activity the rebellious 
discontent. Had there been no needle gun in the case the first of the 
encounters might have been in favour of the Austrians, and so long as they 
had victory on their side the men would probably have remained true to 
their colours; a fortunate soldier is pleased with himself and contented with 
his position; it is reverse and privation which excite disloyal feelings, and 
relax the ties of discipline. 
Would, however, the Austrians have escaped ultimate defeat if there had 
been no needle gun against them ? This of course is a matter of specula¬ 
tion. They certainly ought to have been able to drive the Crown Prince’s 
invading force back into Silesia, because by the relative positions of the 
various army corps on both sides the Austrians had a superior number 
ready to oppose to him. Any further inferences, can only be drawn from 
comparing the leadership and tactical proficiency on both sides. The com¬ 
parison is not favourable to the Austrians. The chief foundations for this 
statement may be shortly laid down. 
The Austrians neglected proper precautions for defending the passes into 
Bohemia, and when the enemy was approaching their positions the Corps 
Commanders did not generally execute satisfactorily the orders which 
Benedek transmitted to them. It was also clear on one or two occasions 
(especially at Tobitschau and Blumenau) by the facility with which the 
Austrians were surprised and outflanked, that either there was a want of 
system for learning the enemy's movements, or that the proper duties were 
shamefully neglected. 
The Prussians neglected nothing, whilst they ventured much. Their 
mode of invasion exposed the armies to a serious risk until their junction 
was effected, but this was indispensable. They could not throw so large a 
force into Bohemia in any other manner, on account of their being but few 
good roads over the intervening mountains. The invention of this plan 
was generally attributed to Yon Moltke, the chief of the King's Staff; but 
there was no originality in it, for in Frederick the Great's time separate 
columns of Prussian troops had repeatedly crossed the mountains by the 
same, or nearly the same, routes, and had united at some preconcerted point 
in the basin of Bohemia. What is most to be admired in the Prussian 
strategy is the exactness with which the plans were carried into effect 
throughout the war. Barely has so large a force executed extensive opera¬ 
tions with such remarkable absence of mistakes and failures, within the first 
ew days after hostilities being declared. And in their tactical dispositions 
or giving battle they showed a peculiar readiness for planning and making 
