THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
375 
attacks on the enemy's flank. This manoeuvre is one of the most effective 
that can be performed if it be executed with precision; but, as the force in 
front is necessarily weakened, flank attacks can seldom be ventured upon 
except when there is a superiority of numbers on the assailant's side. It 
was however part of the Prussian system to rely on the needle gun giving 
them such an advantage as to enable them, when numbers were equal, to 
resort to this operation, thus developing to the utmost the application of 
their peculiar weapon.* 
How could an army have fulfilled its mission better ? It is the highest 
testimony to the Prussian training and organization, that an army hastily 
raised to the full establishment—with the Danish affairs of 1848 and 1864 
as their only experience of war—should have acted like veterans formed by 
years of service in the field. 
Yet of this army Benedek had spoken in the following terms, when he 
issued the address before mentioned. “We are now faced," he said, 
“ by inimical forces composed partly of troops of the line and partly of 
Landwehr. The first comprises young men not accustomed to privations 
and fatigues, and who have never yet made an important campaign ; the 
latter is composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements, which, rather than 
fight against us, would prefer the downfall of their government. In conse* 
quence of a long course of years of peace the enemy does not possess a 
single general who has had the opportunity of learning his duties on the 
field of battle. Ye ter an s of the Mincio and Palestro, I hope that with 
tried leaders you will not allow the slightest advantage to such an 
adversary." 
It must be confessed that this language was ill-chosen and arrogant, and 
his use of such terms must be regretted by those who are aware of his 
previous achievements, or who have personally learned his private worth. 
Its only excuse must be that it was intended to give confidence to his men 
and to accord with the tone of the public press. 
Peldzeugmeister Ludwig von Benedek had been called to the supreme 
command by the Emperor, with the general approval of the army, and to 
the perfect satisfaction of the Austrian people, he had distinguished himself 
at the head of an army corp in the Italian campaign of 1859 ; and was indeed 
the only one of the corps commanders who had come with credit out of the 
contest As an independent commander-in-chief he had indeed had no 
experience, but every one felt sure that he would not repeat the errors of 
hesitation and inactivity which had so often been the reproach of Austrian 
leaders. So far, but no further, he justified popular expectations. 
It is not indeed to be supposed that he is responsible for the want of 
preparation which made the Austrians behindhand in taking the offensive; 
nor for the unguarded state of the Bohemian passes* The Emperor's 
military advisers, and the War Department at Yienna* are chargeable with 
these omissions. The neglect caused a sacrifice of advantages which the 
Austrians could ill spare, but left them still with the chances of success 
favourable to their side. The time when Benedek's generalship came first 
into play was after the defeat which all his advanced corps suffered at the 
* This is clearly laid down in the book of instructions already quoted. 
