376 
MINUTES OF PHOCEEDINGS OF 
end of June. If lie then recommended a retreat, and proposed not to offer 
battle until circumstances were more favourable for it, he is not answerable 
for the consequence of his advice being disregarded, and his proposition 
over-ruled. It is however to be presumed that the choice of a field of battle, 
anywhere near his actual position, was left to his unfettered judgment, and 
in this choice he is fairly open to criticism.* 
You will remember that he drew up his army facing the Bistritz brook 
with outposts resting on the stream ; his right was near Horenowes, his left 
was at Prim. He made no special dispositions for securing his flanks, but he 
had nearly double the number of men necessary for holding the length of 
front he occupied. 
You will also remember that the 1st Army and the Elbe Army were straight 
before him, whilst the 2nd or Crown Prince's army, was in such a position 
that if it took any part in the battle it must fall upon the right flank. 
Had Benedek placed the Elbe between himself and the Prussians, or had 
he taken up a line between Koniggratz and Chlumetz as suggested by an 
eminent German critic,! he would have a good defensive position, and have 
been secure for a day or two against a combined attack. Had he vigorously 
assailed the 1st Army he might possibly have defeated it before the Crown 
Prince came up. Either of these measures would have been reasonable. In 
placing himself between the river and the Prussians, and waiting passively there, 
he adopted a half measure without anything to* recommend it. His expectant 
attitude on the morning of the battle showed that his intention was to act 
defensively, and this being the case it is incomprehensible how he should so 
much have neglected the right flank. It is bad for an army to be drawn up 
with a front like two sides of a square, it is far worse to be open to an attack 
which would require such a formation without offering any front at all 
towards one of the threatened sides. 
Having chosen such a position, and made such a faulty disposition of his 
troops within it, it was almost inevitable that Benedek should get the worst 
of the battle, provided the Prussians brought their whole force into action on 
the same day: but according as he handled his men skilfully (or not), 
would probably depend whether he merely failed to maintain his ground, or 
whether his forces were routed. Here again he seems to have failed in the 
ability required and expected of him, and his failure was in this wise. 
There is no more elementary or more important principle to be observed, 
than that a general should keep about one-fifth part of his army in reserve, 
subject solely to his personal orders; and it is a simple test of his tactical 
skill whether he seizes the right crisis for employing it. The present 
accounts of the battle of Koniggratz leave it uncertain what the exact 
arrangements were in this respect, but there seems to have been, in rear of 
the line exposed to any attack, at least double the proportion of men usually 
so disposed. In the absence of information to the contrary it would seem 
that these troops, consisting of two entire corps, were not retained under 
Benedek's personal orders, but were entrusted with supporting the first line 
* Other evidences of want of capacity have been attributed to him, but, even supposing them to 
prove well founded, their establishment would have required the introduction of matter unsuitable 
to this outline. 
f Kiistow; Der Krieg von 1866, p. 219. 
