380 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
Audrian Army . 
A coeps contained about 38 battalions of line infantry, 3 battalions of light 
infantry (Jagers or Grenzers), 10 squadrons of cavalry, and 10 batteries of artillery; 
in numbers about 38,000 foot, 1500 horse, and 80 guns. 
It consisted of 4 infantry brigades, a cavalry brigade, and an artillery reserve. 
Each infantry brigade contained two regiments (6 battalions) of line infantry, 
and a battalion of Jagers; with one battery of field artillery. 
A cavalry brigade contained two regiments (10 squadrons) of cavalry, and a 
horse artillery battery. 
The artillery reserve of a corps contained 3 heavy field batteries, 3 horse artillery 
batteries, and a rocket battery. 
A battalion contained about 1000 men, a squadron 150 horses, and a battery 
8 guns. 
It will be observed that the division is omitted from this organization. 
The change has been made since 1859; it is now only employed for 
infantry when two or three brigades are required to act as a detached force; 
for cavalry however, it is still retained as an independent unit, a complete 
army comprising one or more cavalry divisions in addition to the corps 
as above described. 
A cavalry division contains 3 brigades (3 heavy and 1 light), and 3 horse artillery 
batteries; in numbers about 3900 horse and 34 guns. 
An “ army artillery reserve '' is also sent into the field as a unit in¬ 
dependent of the Corps; its normal composition is to have twice as many 
batteries as the army has corps; that is to say, an army of 5 corps would 
have an artillery reserve of 10 batteries. 
The Prussians found it desirable to mass the cavalry divisions of the 
several corps into large divisions before the battle of Koniggratz. They also 
found the division a more convenient unit than the corps for infantry 
arrangements. The fact is that the organization by corps is more applicable 
to widely extended operations than to the handling of large masses of men 
on the same field of action. 
Note B. to p. 357. 
Since this lecture was sent to the press an article has been published in 
the Edinburgh Review (No., 256, April, 1867), which gives very authoritative 
accounts of the Prussian plans and movements, especially those of the 2nd 
or Crown Prince's army, in the early and decisive periods of the campaign. 
According to this writer the only chance of success for the 2nd Army 
seemed to be by throwing the 1st and the Elbe Army rapidly forward upon 
Gitschin, wherefore the forces placed under Prince Erederick Charles' orders 
were made strong enough to bear down any opposition which, from what 
was known of the Austrian positions, he was likely to encounter. 
With the execution of this scheme on the Prince's part the writer is not 
satisfied, considering that he acted with a wariness and a caution inconsistent 
with the attainment of the main object in view. He also quotes a dis¬ 
paraging criticism, and an unfavourable comparison between Prince Erederick 
Charles and the Crown Prince, from a German military periodical; probably 
