THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
381 
one of those which caused the antagonism and dissatisfaction mentioned in 
the note at p. 357. 
Note C, to pp. 360 and 362. 
The article in the Edinburgh Review attributes all the Prussian arrange¬ 
ments to the King's Staff, denying any merit to Prince Erederick Charles, 
and pointedly stating that— 
“ It would have required more genius than Prince Erederick Charles possesses 
to discern, when he overlooked the position of Sadowa and Chi urn, on the morning 
of July 3rd, that it was dangerous to attack it before being assured of the near 
approach of the Crown Prince.” 
The application for a corps to be sent out by the 2nd Army referred only 
to making a reconnoissance from that direction, and had already been ordered 
by the Crown Prince before the messenger arrived. The article contains the 
King's written instructions dated 2nd July, 11 p.m., which after premising 
the grounds for expecting an encounter at Sadowa the next morning, con¬ 
cludes with,— 
" Your Ptoyal Highness will take the necessary measures to support the 1st Army 
with all forces against the right flank of the expected march of the enemy, and will 
attack as soon as possible.” 
Similar instructions were sent to the Elbe Army. Those addressed to 
the Crown Prince did not reach him at Koniginhof till 4 a.m., and it was 
5 before his own orders could be despatched. Part of the Guard was 
however on the spot, and it fortunately happened that the 6th Corps had 
had previous orders to march in the early morning on a reconnoitring 
expedition towards Josefstadt. 
The description of the further movements and of the action is generally 
in accordance with the account in the lecture. It is highly interesting to 
learn the exact state of the case about the arrangements for engaging in so 
important a battle. The story about its entire fate turning on the chance 
of Prince Erederick Charles' aide-de-camp escaping capture by Austrian 
patrols, and evading the other risks attendant on a midnight journey, fails 
to hold its place as an historic fact. It had always an improbable appearance 
that the Prince should have offered battle on his own responsibility when 
the King was near at hand, and had assumed the general command. 
Note D. Expenditure of Ammunition, 
The instance referred to at p. 377 occurred in the operations of Goeben's 
division of the Maine Army, and is thus narrated in an account, evidently 
written by some one present on the occasion, which appeared in the 
“Kolnische Zeitung'' of 21st August, 1866. 
“ Bischofsheim was defended only by the 55 th Regiment, the Lippe battalion, 
and two companies of the 15 th Regiment, and out of that number five companies did 
not fire a shot, for they were partly posted as reserves in Bischofsheim, and partly 
employed in continually bringing up fresh ammunition to the companies standing on 
[VOL. v.] 51 
