a 
MINUTES OF PKOCEEDINGS OF 
progress made in the artilleries of other nations, and the increased effect obtained 
from rifled small-arms, at length compelled a change, that the then Colonel 
Br. Smola, jointly with Major Plochinger, received an order in 1850 to 
frame a project for a new system of field artillery. From this starting point, 
the so-called “projects-materiel” (experimental material), with a system of 
gun-carriages and wagons of materially lighter construction, became gradually 
developed, and w r as eventually introduced on the adoption of rifled ordnance. 
Even as early as this period, it was the primary aim of the artilleries of all 
nations to adapt the construction of the materiel to the tactical requirements; 
the principle that the gun was no longer to be regarded as a simple wagon 
but a decisive instrument of warfare, became more and more determinedly 
asserted. The field artillery ammunition consisted of solid shot and case for 
the gun, common shell and case for the howitzer. Shrapnel was added in 
the second part of this period. The solid shot was the principal missile of 
the field gun. The shell was fitted with the simple wooden fuze, and did not 
as a rule burst over the point aimed at, but generally behind it. The accu¬ 
racy of the shell practice was proverbially very bad. No improvement took 
place until the introduction of the “ eccentric” shell. The shrapnel was 
also originally fitted with the wood fuze. Its effect was, in consequence, of no 
great importance; the key to the development of its value lay clearly in the 
invention of a fuze capable of adaptation to requirements. Consequently, in 
the further development of the experiments carried on with the shrapnel, all 
manner of new constructions of fuzes were tried; no range of artillery 
technical science was so fertile in inventions as that of shrapnel fuzes. In 
1852, the Breithaupt fuze was introduced into Austria, but was not tried in 
Prussia till 1855. The marvellous results obtained in the first experi¬ 
ments with shrapnel fire (in consequence of the adoption of this fuze), which 
artillerists had up to that time never dreamed of, naturally caused very high 
expectations to be attached to its employment. The artillery of every country- 
imagined that in it it had discovered an element of superiority over those 
of other countries, as well as an unfailing factor in winning the victory in war. 
With regard to the supply of ammunition, it may further be mentioned, that, 
after the wars above named, the amount of case was considerably reduced. 
The effective power of field guns during this period, is thus portrayed by 
the author 
With solid shot or shell, firing point blank, the greatest range that could 
be employed in the field in order to gain any result worth speaking of was— 
for guns of large calibre 1200 metres, for light guns 1000 metres. 
Ricochet fire could only be taken into account under very exceptionally 
favourable conditions. Monhaupt is quoted by the author, who states :—“ The 
science of ricochet fire is a theory constructed on smooth paper and tested on 
level practice grounds.Where it has been utilised, the results 
have borne no comparison with the amount of ammunition expended.” 
Opinions differed widely with regard to case-fire. The author, however, 
brings forward many proofs to show that case has not produced the results 
which were on all sides expected of it. “ Gradually the doubts with regard 
to the great effect produced by case-fire became more general and more con* 
firmed.” And Decker says, “The effect of case, in war, can be determined by 
no method of calculation.” The author concludes by saying:—“It is un* 
deniable that case-fire was often the last chance for artillery. On account of the 
