THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
3 
small effect produced by solid shot against deployed lines and skirmishers, 
the artillery had recourse proportionately often to case-fire in order to repel 
attack. That was a tradition of the Seven Years'* War, which, owing to the 
comparatively slow and cumbrous system of tactics, as well as the inferior 
training of the infantry, was then correct enough; the correctness, however, 
would necessarily vanish more and more with time. 
Shrapnel fire was denominated “ case-fire for long ranges. ” It is well 
known that to obtain successful results with shrapnel in the field requires 
a thorough acquaintance with the peculiarities of the projectile and with the 
theory of its use. This is the reason why opinions on the value of shrapnel 
have so greatly fluctuated. The highly favourable data given by Bormann 
in the experiments carried out in Belgium, called forth, universally, great 
hopes with regard to the effect of shrapnel. General Okounef says:— 
<c Shrapnel must give to artillery such a destroying effect, that it will decide 
the fate of future battles.” 
In the 4th Chapter of the ] st Part, the author examines the conditions 
with regard to the effect and mobility of field guns. With regard to effect, the 
6-pr. was taken as the minimum; with regard to mobility, the 12-pr. The 
necessity for increasing the mobility of field artillery had undoubtedly arisen 
during the period of twenty years. This was, in part, caused by the greater 
mobility imparted to infantry tactics. The efforts to obtain mobility, indeed, 
increased beyond the desirable limits, in spite of the valuable opinions of 
Decker, Gravenitz, Birkenstein, and others, who always maintained “ that the 
primary condition to be attained in artillery must ever remain effect.” 
The almost universal solution arrived at was, “ maximum mobility com¬ 
bined with only necessary effect.” And so the state of affairs remained until 
a successful reaction arose, owing to the increased effects of rifled small-arms. 
The condition “ necessary effect only,” then became altered, and brought 
about a modification of the limit of mobility. The existence of two calibres 
in all systems of artillery proved that the problem of attaining every require¬ 
ment in effect and mobility could not be solved with one calibre. 
In the 5th Chapter of the 2nd Part, the author gives a very interesting 
sketch of the development of horse artillery. The most important point here 
is the controversy between riding and driving ( cavalry ) artillery. 
The lesson attaching to, and to be deduced from, the tactics of horse 
artillery in action, resolved itself simply into an extreme utilisation of the 
principles of mobility. The burden of the problem lay in this :—“ Bapid and 
spirited advance against the enemy, and decision of the fight at a given point 
by a quick and sudden fire of case.” Horse artillery went too far, indeed, 
with this idea, and still ran away after a phantom when- the introduction of 
rifled arms had long made the carry ing out of it impossible. 
The 6th Chapter deals with the organisation, comparative strength, and 
training of the artillery during this period. Here also a rich field of striking 
ideas is presented, as well as numerous details with regard to the different 
systems of organisation in use with the various artilleries of that time. These 
are more particularly of value to the military historian. 
In the 7th Chapter, tactics is treated on. 
The principles governing the definition of the “ tactical unit,” which 
determined it as the battery, appear then, and also during the entire period, 
to have contributed greatly to the fallacious scattered employment of artillery. 
