THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
9 
of the late war, that they held out under a very great number of rounds 
without losing accuracy, and that not a single piece burst. 
In the two following chapters, the author discusses the changes in the 
ammunition, and also the various views which arose during this period on the 
effect and importance of rifled field guns. The following lines are quoted 
from him:— 
“ The shell remained the principal projectile. The improvement effected in 
the fuze adaptation was undeniable. The larger angle of incidence resulting 
from the firing at long ranges had, further, been the cause of the effect of 
the shell being incompletely developed.” 
A closer examination into the causes which had exercised an unfavourable 
influence on the effective power of shell, led to improvements which restored 
confidence to this class of projectile. The war of 1870-1, therefore, also 
justified in an unexpected degree the confidence placed on shell-fire. 
Shrapnel, in spite of very warm controversies, quickly gained the confidence 
of artillerists. In November, 1870, the amount of shrapnel was increased 
in Austria to one-third of the total ammunition equipment. In the Swiss 
artillery shrapnel gained favour daily. The “ Militar-Zeitung ” of 1867 
said :—“ Shrapnel is the missile of the future; even case will be placed in 
question when compared with it.” Indeed, so much value was attached to 
shrapnel, that in 1870 General Vigneau demanded it as the principal 
artillery projectile. In Prussia, after the experiments of 1869, the introduc¬ 
tion of shrapnel with the modified Richter fuze was ordered for rifled field 
guns in the spring of 1870. The sudden outbreak of war in 1870 un¬ 
fortunately prevented its being practically tested in the field; a few batteries 
only received shrapnel, and then only as a supplementary ammunition, which 
was employed in isolated cases. 
Major Muller expresses the idea that the fuzes constructed since, and 
tested with such successful results, together with the increased training in 
the art of shrapnel fire, have made so much more powerful an effect 
possible, as to require that it should attain the same high importance which 
has resulted with the common shell. 
With regard to case-fire, the author says’:—“ In spite of all theoretical 
arguments, and the brave efforts of the horse artillery,* the war of 1866 
manifested the utter worthlessness of case-fire when opposed to rifled small- 
arms. If the Prussian batteries—which had a good case gun, and entered 
into the war with the best intention of employing it in offence—in no case 
succeeded in making use of it, then, not only was this question solved for all 
time, but the use of case-fire in the offensive was proved to be worthless.” 
“Case could be only regarded as the last resource of artillery— i.e., for self* 
defence up to 450 metres—and could, in consequence, be only carried in small 
proportion.” The extreme superiority attached to case, diffused by the 
adherents of Arkolav, arose for the most part from the complete defeat of 
the Austrian infantry and artillery by the Prussian infantry. The false 
ideas arising from these circumstances led to the conviction that a powerful 
support was essentially required against such infantry, which could only 
* It must be remembered that the Prussian horse artillery in 1866 was exclusively armed with 
smooth-bore 12-prs. 
2 
