THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
11 
on these heads, but more especially those of Prince Hohenlohe, General 
du Vignau and Captain (now Lt.-Col.) Frederich Muller, of the Austrian army. 
Our readers will be sufficiently conversant with this portion of the more 
modern military literature, so we may refrain from going into it further. 
The necessity for an augmentation of the artillery is particularly pointed out. 
In a tactical point of view, the general idea prevailed that it is important to 
be superior in artillery to your opponent, even in the first stage of the fight. 
Period Y. The War op 1870-71.— Experience gained from the 
Sphere op Field Artillery, and the Deduction resulting prom it. 
It is known that the superiority of the French rifle made itself at once 
felt in the early engagements, but the superiority of the German artillery 
over that of the enemy was just as clearly apparent—a superiority which, 
moreover, decided the character of most of the battles of the war. 
The peculiar character of the artillery fighting on the German side was 
almost exclusively brought about by common shell, since shrapnel was only used 
in some artilleries of the German armies. Ranges of 3000-4000 paces and 
over frequently occurred; the actual limit of range employed in the generality 
of cases lay between 1500 and 2500 paces. On the offensive, the shortest 
range to which it was possible to advance was from 600 to 900 metres, and 
then only under favourable circumstances. At a distance of 600 metres the 
artillery losses from infantry fire were, as a rule, very considerable; and 
when opposed to unshaken infantry, great losses were suffered, even at 
ranges of from 900 to 1500 metres—the batteries being, indeed, compelled 
to retire. The effect of common shell sufficed, with few exceptions, for all 
kinds and conditions of fighting. 
Case-fire was employed on the Prussian side in about 40 cases, in self- 
defence. In 20 cases, the object was directly gained; whereas, in the others, 
it was uncertain whether or not the attack was not warded off by other 
collateral causes. 
With regard to the expenditure of ammunition in the battles about Metz, 
the following facts are known :— 
14th August, 2,849 common shell, 6 case; 16th August, 19,638 common 
shell, 19 case; 18th August, 34,481 common shell, 179 shrapnel, 20 case. 
Speaking of the successes of the German artillery, the author cites the 
Russian Baron Seddeler, who remarks :—“The artillery gained an indepen¬ 
dence which even exceeded the boldest aspirations of artillerists. It is 
scarcely possible to effect more than was done by the artillery; the numerous 
victories are mainly due to its co-operation.” The Austrian Major Rosinich 
says that “ the principal share in the destruction and conquest of the French, 
in all battles and actions, must be ascribed to the German artillery.” 
The author draws from the experience of this war the following conclusions, 
as the objects artillerists should keep in view 
“The necessity of engaging frequently at ranges over 2500 paces, and 
the possibility of thus attaining undoubted decisive results, make it at all 
events desirable to extend and enlarge the present capabilities and effect of 
the guns by, on an average, from 400 to 500 metres. 
"■ The intensity of the effect of artillery fire is capable of increase, by the 
