THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION 
217 
Prussian war broke out—the Emperor had issued a decree ordering the 
formation of a great central arsenal for Prance at Bourges; but, unfor¬ 
tunately, time was wanting to carry out the plan. As it was, Metz 
contained the principal arsenal, and the chief manufactories of war 
materiel in the whole country ; and thus, all the vast resources and 
supplies which the place contained became useless from the moment 
of its investment. Of course, the investment of such a place of arms 
at once blocks np the channels of supply to the country, and the vast 
stores locked up in it become as useless for the defence of the state as 
if they were already actually in the hands of the enemy. Thus, although 
Metz and its resources did not fall into the hands of the Prussians for a 
considerable period, yet for all practical purposes they were lost to the 
French ; and the latter were compelled to resort at once to foreign 
markets in order to provide the necessary war materiel for the new 
levies and reserves, with which they vainly endeavoured to stem the 
tide of invasion. 
Another instance of a great arsenal and place of arms constructed 
for purely offensive purposes, is afforded by Sebastopol, Its sole 
raison d'etre was the ultimate view of an attack upon Turkey ; and when 
Russia, in her turn, became the object of attack on the part of the allied 
powers, the great development of the dockyards and arsenals of 
Sebastopol, combined with the accessibility of the place to the fleets 
and armies of the allies, rendered it a most prominent and tempting 
object for their efforts; while, at the same time, its distance from the 
capital, and the state of its communications with the centre of the 
empire, rendered its succour a difficult, costly, and finally an unsuccess¬ 
ful affair. 
Archduke Charles . 
Speaking of fortresses and places of arms, both of an offensive and 
a defensive character, the Archduke Charles, in his “Principes de la 
Grande Guerre/' lays down as follows:—“ For fortresses which are 
destined to serve as a support to offensive operations, one must princi¬ 
pally take into consideration the points from which an offensive war 
can and ought to be carried out against the enemy ; that is to say, the 
chief avenues to his country, and the communications with the same* 
They should contain important magazines, and be so situated that, in 
case of disaster, they should cover the retreat of the army, and hinder 
the progress of the enemy. They ought, consequently, to be of consider¬ 
able size. There is a third species of fortresses, which are less for the 
defence of frontiers than for the safety and preservation of a whole 
country. These fortresses should be placed in the interior of the 
provinces, and are, properly speaking, places of arms. Their object is 
to preserve stores of all kinds for the maintenance and equipment of 
armies, to receive beaten troops, to favor their organisation and arma¬ 
ment, and also to offer a rallying point for the military forces still existing 
in the provinces. But such fortresses must have a great enceinte: they 
should be situated at central points where the roads from the interior are 
met by those from the exterior, and whence communications extend to 
