MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
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the countries in rear; or else, a cheval, on navigable rivers, of which 
they should assure the communication from one bank to the other.” 
If we centralise our manufactures in fortresses of the description 
mentioned in the first portion of the above remarks, we are evidently 
acting on a wrong principle, as is apparent from the unfortunate 
example of Metz. Bourges, on the other hand, constitutes a good 
instance of the description of place of arms contemplated in the latter 
portion of the Archdukes remarks; and such a position would constitute 
an excellent site, strategically speaking, for the establishment of large 
manufactories of war materiel. 
Position of the Capital . 
The seizure of the capital of a nation by an enemy's army, is like 
arresting the action of the heart in the human body. It paralyzes the 
action of all the members, and, as a general rule, peace must be obtained 
at any price which the conquerors may choose to exact. Nevertheless, 
such a contingency need not be absolutely fatal, as long as armies con¬ 
tinue to remain in the field, and possess the means of organising and 
equipping themselves for further conflict. On two occasions, after 
securing the Austrian capital, Napoleon had to beat their armies in the 
field, in order to crown the issue of the campaign; while his occupation 
of Moscow failed utterly in bringing the Bussians to terms. Nothing can 
be easier than to paralyze the military forces of a weak power, or even 
of a great one, by seizing upon its main sources of supply of war 
materiel. Unless it should be enabled to obtain the necessary supplies 
by purchase from abroad, it is simply deprived of all means of further 
resistance, and must inevitably submit to whatever terms the invader 
may think fit to impose. The seizure of the capital of a state may, to 
a certain extent, paralyze the action of a Government; but the posses¬ 
sion of its main arsenal and manufactures of war materiel grasps the 
source of its absolute force by the throat, and renders further resistance 
hopeless. At the present day it would almost appear to be of greater 
importance to obtain possession of the main arsenals than even of the 
capital itself. This being the case, nothing can be more unadvisable 
than to have the main arsenal and the capital lying immediately 
adjacent to one another—unless, indeed, it were possible to have them 
so strongly fortified as for one to assist in the defence of the other. 
But even granting this, there is a homely proverb which teaches us 
that we should not place all our eggs in the same basket, and so risk 
losing all our fortune at one fell swoop, owing to some untoward acci¬ 
dent which it would be impossible to have foreseen. Dangers which can 
be foreseen can be provided" against; but it is only by removing, as far 
as our power extends, the mere possibility of accident, that we can 
guard ourselves against the unforeseen, which is ever the most dangerous 
element in war. When the main arsenal and the capital of a country 
lie widely apart, it becomes a grave question for a Government acting 
on the offensive to choose their object of attack. They may choose 
either to strike at the political centre of the country by moving on the 
capital, or they may prefer to direct the action of the invading army 
