THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
223 
consider how far their centralisation, in so small an area, coincides with 
the principles laid down in the first portion of this essay. Firstly, with 
regard to strategical considerations. The policy of this country is, and 
has been for many years, an eminently defensive one; but in the pur¬ 
suance of this defensive policy, partly owing to our insular position, and 
partly to our naval superiority, we have always hitherto been enabled 
to carry on an offensive warfare on the continent. For this purpose 
the situation of Woolwich is admirably adapted, provided we have not 
to contend with a naval power. The facilities for shipment afforded by 
the great port of London, and its vicinity to the shores of the continent, 
render the situation of Woolwich peculiarly favourable for supplying the 
wants of an army acting in France, Belgium,, or the Low Countries. It 
has, however, been pointed out by the Commissioners on the Defences 
of the United Kingdom that we should find our arsenals very unfavour¬ 
ably situated in case of a war with a naval power like France. They 
observe:—“ The difficulty that was experienced during the last war 
with France in passing vessels in safety down the Channel, will be 
much increased in future wars, owing to the introduction of steam as a 
motive power. Sailing vessels will be unable to pass the Straits of 
Dover without being in danger of capture by the steam cruizers of the 
enemy, which may be lying in wait in any of the Channel ports, and 
from whose rapid motion even the most efficient convoy will scarcely 
suffice to protect them; so that, unless the stores at Woolwich are 
transported across country to some western port, it will be extremely 
difficult to keep up communications with the out-stations in time of war.” 
From the above it would appear that, even from an offensive point of 
view alone, Woolwich does not possess a very commanding situation. 
For the supply of India, however, and that of all our colonies, and 
garrisons to the eastward, Woolwich is no doubt most conveniently 
situated. Provided, also, that no enemy's cruizers should exist, or be 
able to keep the seas, in an European war, Woolwich—placed as she is 
on the main avenue of communication with the continent, viz. the 
Thames—forms a ready and convenient base for the supply of warlike 
stores to a British army acting on the. continent. Let us now turn to 
the defensive point of view. Supposing that, by some sudden and 
unforeseen revolution in the wheel of fortune, we should be ourselves 
in turn attacked and invaded by a hostile army, it is difficult to state 
any point in which Woolwich is suited for an actually defensive warfare. 
It cannot be considered as in any way central as regards the other parts 
of the country. It is situated almost on the seaboard, instead of the 
interior of the country. An army beaten on the coast on the first land¬ 
ing of the enemy would naturally direct their retreat towards the capital 
and Woolwich, but neither the one nor the other possesses any fortifi¬ 
cations to receive them. Such an army would, indeed^ find ample means 
of armament and re-equipment, but no time would be given them for 
reorganisation. With an enemy following close at their heels, and 
pressing them Vepee dans les reins , they would have to turn and fight 
behind such hasty earthworks as might have been thrown up in the 
interim in the vicinity of the capital; and the issue of the battle would 
probably not only decide the fate of London and Woolwich, but that of 
