224 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
the whole of England. In fact,, we might live to see the realisation of 
the clever conception of the author of the “ Battle of Dorking.” It has 
been said that the main arsenal and the capital of a state should not be 
immediately adjacent to one another; but London and Woolwich have 
this very fault. Provided the capital and the main arsenal lie widely 
apart ; the enemy has at least to choose between two objectives. Either 
he may make for the capital; and having obtained possession of it; trust 
to the clamours of the civil population to obtain the submission of the 
forces still remaining in the field; or he may decide upon attempting to 
seize upon the main arsenal; and thence; with the chief source of military 
power securely in his hands; to proceed to the subjugation of the 
remainder of the country. When, however, the main arsenal and the 
capital are, so to speak, one and the same, there can be no room left for 
hesitation in the choice of an object. No amount of advantage gained 
elsewhere could equal that secured by the possession of the joint centres 
of military and political power; and these, being totally devoid of any 
means of prolonging the struggle by a passive resistance, might both 
fall at a single blow. Its immediate proximity to the capital apart, an 
arsenal which is chiefly calculated for offensive purposes more frequently 
than otherwise becomes an element of weakness when on the defensive, 
for it offers a point open to attack. We have but to consider the fate 
of Sebastopol, Metz, and Strasbourg to convince ourselves of this truth. 
As matters at present stand, there can be no doubt but that the question 
of protecting both London and Woolwich by a combined system of 
fortifications is one of paramount importance. With reference to this 
subject the Commissioners on the Defences of the United Kingdom 
report as follows :—“ Whilst we are considering the protection of the 
vital points against which an enemy intent upon inflicting a heavy blow 
upon the country would direct his efforts, the question of the defence of 
London presents itself. There can be no doubt that the main object of 
an enemy invading this country would be to push for the capital, in the 
hope that if he succeeded in obtaining command of it, such a disaster 
would result in our buying him off upon any terms he might think it 
expedient to exact.” We are aware that there are many persons 
who suppose that resistance would be prolonged in the provinces even 
after London and Woolwich had fallen into the hands of the enemy; 
but these expectations would appear to be rather founded on the 
somewhat gratuitous assumption that our population would prove itself 
more exceptionally brave and strenuous in its resistance to a foreign 
invader than that of other civilised countries, rather than on any well- 
founded calculation depending on a well-considered organisation of our 
resources and means of further resistance. Should we not rather find 
ourselves in the position described by Le Comte de Chapelle in his 
work entitled “Les forces militaires de la France en 1870”?—“ It is 
only by making known the numerous resources which France possessed; 
by recalling the illusions which even the most competent men enter¬ 
tained as to the promptitude with which we could pass from a peace to 
a war footing, that people can be convinced that what was wanting 
above everything was neither men, nor horses, nor materiel, nor stores, 
but an organisation which would have admitted of the assembling of all 
