THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
m 
may, however, be doubted whether a sudden expansion of manufacturing 
power cannot be sooner effected in several establishments, each on a 
separate basis, than in one large one which would almost appear to 
have already attained a maximum of development. In the event of 
domestic dissensions, it is difficult to estimate how far Woolwich would 
be advantageously situated, or the contrary; for it is impossible to 
foresee in what quarter so fortunately improbable an event would arise. 
Happily for England, London contains at present no such dangerous 
population as the Communists of Paris; but did it do so, the proximity 
of our great arsenal to the capital would in this case also be a great 
element of danger to the state. Perhaps the most inflammable portion 
of the United Kingdom at the present moment is Ireland; and in the 
case of so unfortunate an event as a serious rebellion occurring in that 
country, an arsenal on the western coast would certainly be better adapted 
for supplying the necessary warlike stores than Woolwich. 
Proposed System of Decentralisation. 
During the late Franco-Prussian war, we have had presented before 
us the spectacle of two antagonistic systems pitted the one against the 
other. The system of excessive centralisation pursued by the French 
military authorities encountered that of decentralisation, on which the 
organisation of the Prussian army is so extensively based. The result 
was unmistakeably in favour of the latter, and it only remains for our¬ 
selves to profit by the experience which has proved so costly to others. 
Already we have introduced into our army administration the principle 
of decentralisation as regards men, and that of materiel must follow as 
a matter of course. The question of the inexpediency of massing our 
military manufactories and our supplies of warlike stores in one spot 
has already long occupied the attention of the Government of this 
country, but unfortunately no steps have as yet been taken to remedy 
the existing state of things. So far back as 1859, the Commissioners 
on the Defences of the United Kingdom recommended the. establish¬ 
ment of a central depot on Cannock Chase, and further expressed an 
opinion of the advisability of forming another great arsenal at Runcorn, 
on the Mersey. Both these sites would appear to be admirably adapted 
for all contingencies. We should then possess three great arsenals of 
construction in Great Britain; for, after all the outlay which has taken 
place there, and in view of the vast manufacturing power which has 
become gradually agglomerated there, we could never afford to dis¬ 
establish Woolwich. Speaking generally, Runcorn and Woolwich 
would then manufacture all the war materiel required for the navy, 
while the central place of arms at Cannock Chase would minister to the 
wants of the army and reserve forces of Great Britain. In the words 
of General Trochu, we should thus effect that preparation for war 
“ which consists in echelonning our resources and our existing means of 
resistance in a suitable direction.” For purposes of distribution and 
supply, we should further require a certain number of second-class 
arsenals at the head-quarters of the more important military districts; 
while, for the less important ones, and for the sub-districts, third-class 
arsenals or minor depots of supply would be established. 
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