m 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
The following may be generally considered to be the distribution of 
war materiel 
1. In hands of active army. 
2. In store for army and reserve forces. 
3. In course of construction. 
Of the above, the last-mentioned, together with all the reserve 
stores intended for army and reserves, would be located in the three 
grand arsenals; while further reserves of materiel would be stored in 
the second-class arsenals, leaving it to the minor depots of supply to 
take care of the equipment for immediate service required by the lesser 
tactical units on taking the field. 
With such a system carefully and judiciously carried out, it would 
seem impossible for us to be surprised under almost any conditions. 
In peace we triple our means of production, we possess greater facilities 
for the judicious employment of contracts and private individuals for 
construction in case of need, and we retain the means of keeping up 
that skilled labor among the civil population which is essential for 
warlike manufactures; for the mind of man is progressive, invention 
leads to invention, and it is rarely that a sufficient accumulation of war 
materiel to render a suspension of manufacture desirable can be effected 
without the stores themselves becoming obsolete and requiring to be 
replaced by different patterns. War could scarcely make demands upon 
us which our increased powers of expansion would not enable us to 
meet, while the fact of each tactical unit starting from its own head¬ 
quarters completed with all the equipment necessary for taking the 
field, would render the organisation of the larger units almost complete 
at the moment of assembly. In civil strife we should probably find two, 
and certainly at least one of the three available for our requirements. 
In the extreme case of an armed rebellion in Ireland, Runcorn would 
be found to be situated in the most advantageous spot possible for 
supplying the army acting in that country. 
Strategically speaking, in case of invasion and when on the defensive, 
we should possess three lines of defence instead of one—provided 
Woolwich and London were to some extent protected by fortifications, 
instead of being utterly defenceless, as at present. The fall of London 
and Woolwich together would not then necessarily involve the sub¬ 
mission of the country ; for the Court could withdraw to the north, while 
a fresh army assembled around the great place of arms at Cannock 
Chase would again try the chances of war. Even if unsuccessful in the 
field, the fortifications of the central arsenal itself would prove no small 
obstacle to an enemy’s army. Protected as Cannock Chase might be 
by a species of quadrilateral, formed by fortifying the great strategic 
points of Birmingham, Rugby, Trent, and Crewe, we might form an 
almost impregnable place of arms. Supposing this also to fail us, our 
troops would still be able to make a final stand on the Mersey. 
Turning to the offensive, we should find that the principle of 
decentralisation of war materiel would enable us to equip and organise 
armies with a celerity to which we have hitherto been strangers* In 
the event of war on the continent, India, or any of our colonies to the 
