OKEHAMPTON EXPERIMENTS. 
543 
as far as possible followed the instructions conveyed in the memorandum on 
Formations for Attack on the Half-battalion System/' which accompanied 
General Orders No. 23 of 1873. 
The rules for conducting the attack of a division are there laid down, and 
may briefly be stated as follows - 
The attack will commence with a general advance, and assuming the 
division to consist of two brigades, one brigade will be formed in front of the 
other in the formation for attack, while the other brigade, in line of, say, 
half-battalion quarter-columns of companies, will be in reserve, if possible 
under cover, about 500 yds. in rear. 
The brigade attacking on the half-battalion system will advance in, say, 
line of half-battalion quarter-columns of companies at deploying intervals, 
and on finding itself under the fire of artillery, will either deploy or break into 
the attacking formation. 
In the latter, two half-battalions of the same battalion, taken from either 
flanks or centre, will cover the front of the brigade, each with skirmishers 
and supports. 
This attacking formation is represented in Targets Nos. 2 and 10, where 
an attacking line in rank entire, with one pace between each man, is followed 
at about 250 paces by a supporting line in double rank, at open interval; 
the supports being, in their turn, followed at about 350 paces by the main 
body, in company quarter-column at double interval. 
When the attacking line comes within infantry range of the enemy, it 
virtually becomes a line of skirmishers, to be fed by the supports, which in 
turn are fed by the main body and reserves. 
The effect of artillery fire against a formation of this character may be 
considered under two aspects— 
1st.—The distance at which an enemy would be compelled to break 
into a looser formation than column. 
2nd.—The effect of artillery fire upon this looser formation. 
The first step taken by an army in masses, finding itself unexpectedly 
under artillery fire at long ranges, and yet unwilling to injure its powers of 
rapid and concentrated locomotion, or unable to obtain adequate cover, 
would be probably to open out its columns. In the experiments of the 
13th August this was assumed, and, with 18 rounds of shrapnel with time 
fuze, at a range of 3000 yds., four 16-pr. guns in 11 minutes disabled 109 
out of 400 dummies, drawn up in company quarter-column at open intervals, 
and with six paces between the companies. With a total of 72 rounds of 
various projectiles, it disabled 321 out of 400. 
Under a fire so effective as this, the columns pressing on in rear would be 
compelled to adopt another formation, and would probably advance some- 
what as shewn in Target No. 2. This formation is, in many respects, a very 
favourable one. Fire directed against the first or attacking line produced 
virtually no effect against the supports or main body. The distances were 
such as to render the ricochet of fragments harmless, and therefore, if the fire 
were directed against the attacking line alone, the general advance of the 
main body would not be impeded. 
28. On the 18th August, a rapid fire against the attacking line, the 
