564 
THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART III.) 
most energetic of the new regime. Men, materiel, and organisation were 
wanting ; the cadres of officers had to be filled by many who had never 
served; and the whole staff and administrative services had to be extem¬ 
porised. A small nucleus of regular troops was obtained by assembling 
the uncalled-out reserves, recruits from the various depots, refugees from 
the frontier, and all the old soldiers in the country. Besides the Gardes 
Mobiles,'a portion of the sedentary guard was mobilised, the formation 
of volunteer corps legalised, and after the surrender of Metz a general 
levy decreed of all able-bodied men without distinction between 20 and 
40 years of age. By means of these stringent measures nearly 700,000 
men were raised, organised, and enabled to take an active part against 
the enemy during a period, from first to last, of about four months. 
By liberal contracts, formation of new arsenals, and a general appeal to 
the patriotism of the mercantile classes, the necessary supplies of guns, 
ammunition, clothing’, and all warlike stores were speedily collected. 
To effect the more speedy instruction of the new levies, several camps 
were formed throughout the country—a useful measure which the rapid 
march of events did not permit of being fully taken advantage of. For 
the purposes of local defence the country was divided into four large 
commands in the north, west, centre, and eastern districts. As the 
available effective gradually increased, corps cVarmees were assembled, 
and eventually grouped into the effective armies which played so con¬ 
spicuous a part in the latter portion of the campaign. It must be 
remembered that the main object of all the provincial levies was 
to raise the siege of Paris; and to effect this, either directly or indirectly, 
every strategic movement was directed. Paris was France, and the 
extraordinary fictitious value placed upon the capital must not be lost 
sight of in considering the further military operations. Keeping in 
mind the springing up of armed levies in all parts of the empire, their 
natural assemblage as armies when sufficiently organised, and the ulti¬ 
mate object to which they all devoted themselves, will render more easy 
the task of connecting in one harmonious whole the several apparently 
distinct campaigns of the French Pepublic. 
The war When the III. and IY. Armies were advancing against Paris, in the 
provinces, middle of September, the 4th Cavalry Division was detached southward, 
Sept.-Oct. ag a p 0r p S 0 f observation, towards the Loire. Supported by a small 
force of infantry and artillery, it succeeded in reaching Pithiviers on the 
23rd, after some slight skirmishing with Franc-Tireurs, but its progress 
Map s. -was arrested at Toury a few days later by small bodies of regular troops. 
Early in October the advance from Orleans of troops of all arms forced 
the division to retire to Etampes. The German cavalry covering the 
west of the army of investment were at the same time sharply attacked 
near Maintenon, and it became evident that an advance of the enemy 
from the southern and western quarters might soon be expected. To 
protect the blockading army from the threatened blow, General 
Yon der Tann was given command of the I. Bavarian Corps, the 22nd 
Division, and the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions,* with orders to assume 
the offensive, and clear the country as far as the Loire. Advancing 
* 38,000 men, 160 guns. 
