THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART III.) 
567 
threatening advance of the main French body. He accordingly moved Battle of 
out his troops to a defensive position at Coulmiers, and telegraphed 9 th Nov? 8 * 
for assistance to the 22nd Division at Chartres. Attacked on the 9th 
by very superior forces, he was compelled to retreat with heavy loss 
towards Paris, finally effecting a junction with the 22nd Division at 
Toury on the 10th. The French do not on this occasion seem to have 
taken advantage of their undoubted superiority. By a little better 
management, an extra 30,000 men might easily have been brought on 
the field, and the retreat of Yon der Tanffs troops been seriously 
imperilled. The German advance to Coulmiers, on the other hand, 
was undoubtedly judicious, and rendered retirement more easy. 
General de Paladines did not follow up his success, but drew his 
troops together round Orleans, with the intention of converting it into 
a large entrenched camp, which would serve as a base for further 
operations. In view of the threatening aspect of affairs, the Germans 
despatched the 17th Infantry Division from the investing army to 
Toury, and gave over the command of the whole force to the Duke 
of Mecklenburgh-Schwerin. Reconnoitring parties sent out towards 
Orleans met with no resistance, and a general impression existed that 
an attack from the westward was probably in contemplation. In 
reality, the French were concentrating their forces round Orleans, 
having deemed it too hazardous to make an immediate advance, on 
account of the expected approach of the II. German Army from Metz. 
The Duke, however, acting on the information he possessed, pushed 
the bulk of his force towards Chartres, leaving Toury observed by 
cavalry. On the 16th his main body was quartered at Chartres, Auneau, 
and Rambonillet. The II. Army, meanwhile, had started from Metz in 
three columns, and reached the general line of Troyes-Chaumont on 
the 10th. On account of the threatening position of the French at 
Orleans, the march westward was accelerated—the IX. Corps, which 
was leading, reaching Fontainebleau on the 14th, and gaining a position 
which enabled it directly to influence the operations for covering the 
blockade. The advance of the army passed the Yonne on the 15th, 
thus relieving the Duke of Mecklenburgh of the duty of covering the 
Orleans-Paris road, and enabling him to undertake the exclusive pro¬ 
tection of the western quarter. 
The plan of the German leaders was at this period simple. The 
II. Army had to push forward with its advance troops, and hold defen¬ 
sively the main southern approaches to Paris until its main body had 
come up. The direction in which any offensive movement could then 
be made, depended on the situation of the Loire Army—a matter of 
doubt which the powerful armed reconnaissance of the Duke of 
Mecklenburgh to the westward would soon clear up. The Grand Duke, 
on the other hand, had to push forward to the west and south-west, 
and endeavour to ascertain the character of the resistance in those 
quarters. 
Sharp skirmishes at Dreux, Maintenon, and Chateauneuf soon made 
it evident that the troops in the western quarter consisted of new levies 
belonging to a so-called Army of Brittany, some two divisions strong, 
which was operating from Nogent-le-Rotrou. On the 20th an advance 20thNov. 
