568 
THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART III.) 
was made towards this town, but the French evaded the blow by 
falling back on Le Mans; thus confirming the already entertained 
opinion of the German Staff that no part of the Army of the Loire was 
to be found in the westward. It appeared now certain that the main 
French army was in the vicinity of Orleans. A telegram was accord¬ 
ingly sent to the Grand Duke to pursue towards Le Mans with cavalry, 
and convey the bulk of his force without delay to the assistance of the 
II. Army. To ensure unity of action, the entire German force was 
placed under the command of Prince Frederick Charles. On the 
28th the Duke's troops reached the neighbourhood of Bonneval and 
Chateaudun. 
The II. Army, in the meantime, had arrived on the 20th in the 
neighbourhood of the following places:—IX. Corps Angerville, 
III. Corps Pithiviers, X. Corps Montargis, with two cavalry divisions 
covering the front.* * 
The IX. and III. Corps advanced southward towards Orleans, the 
X. Corps closed in towards the centre, and on the 24th of November 
the German forces occupied an arc extending through Toury and 
Pithiviers to Beaune-la-Rolande. On this day strong reconnaissances 
made it apparent that the front line of the French position stretched 
from Chevilly, by Neuville and Chilleurs, along the edge of the wood to 
Bellegarde. The outposts of the two armies were thus within a few 
thousand paces of each other, but the country was so intricate that but 
little could be seen of the French formations. The Germans were dis¬ 
posed along a line nearly 28 miles in extent, with indifferent lateral 
communication. The French were far superior in numbers, and could 
unseen have massed the greater bulk of their force at any one point. 
On the other hand, owing to the continued wet weather and the heavy 
nature of the soil, a general advance at this period would necessarily be 
confined more or less to the roads. If the French did not attack, 
it would become necessary to storm their lines—a work of great 
difficulty in a country so close, and well adapted for defence. As the 
duty of the II. Army was primarily to cover the blockade, their plan at 
this stage was to act on the defensive if attacked, and if not, to remain 
in a state of quiescence till joined by the forces of the Grand Duke. 
November. The 26th and 27th were passed in trifling outpost engagements, but 
the threatening attitude of the French right induced the Prince to 
move his whole force a little to his left, sending at the same time 
\ 
* Strength on 21st 'November. 
Grand Duke of Mecklenburgh-Schwerin’s Com¬ 
mand :— 
17th and 22nd Infantry Divisions, 
I. Bavarian Corps, 
4th and 6th Cavalry Divisions. 
II. Army (under Prince Frederick Charles):— 
III., IX., and X., Corps. 
1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions. 
36,312 infantry, 
9,190 cavalry, 
208 guns. 
49,607 infantry, 
10,176 cavalry, 
275 guns. 
Forming a total (exclusive of officers, staff, and non-combatants) of 86,000 infantry, 19,400 cavalry, 
and 484 guns. 
