THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART III.) 
571 
100,000 men. The Duke of Mecklenburgh advanced westward on the 
same date in four columns—the 1st Bavarian Corps and the 17th and 
22nd Divisions on the right bank of the river, and the Hessian Division 
on the left. The bridges across the Loire as far as Beaugency had 
been destroyed, and pontoons could not be thrown across on account 
of floating ice. 
A brisk outpost engagement took place on the evening of the 7th, Battle of 
and the German commander, concentrating his troops, attacked the m^thj 07 * 
French line near Cravant and Beaumont the next day. But little lothDeo. 
success was gained, except on the French right, where Beaugency was 
captured. It became evident that the French were numerically much 
superior, and requests were accordingly sent to the remainder of the 
II. Army for assistance. The X. Corps proceeded at once from 
Orleans towards Beaugency, the IX. Corps reinforced its Hessian 
Division on the left bank of the river, and the III. Corps, giving up 
the pursuit eastward, retired on Orleans. On the 9th and 10th a 
severe struggle was maintained with varying success against the centre 
of the French line. Counter attacks from the Marchenoir Forest were 
driven back, and generally speaking the defensive attitude on both 
sides was successfully maintained, but attacks failed. During the 
latter days of the battle the numbers on both sides were nearly equal, 
but the Germans had a decided superiority in cavalry. The French 
General, aware that Bourbaki was unable to come to his assistance, 
and fearing the turning of his right flank, gave orders on the 11th for 
a retreat on Freteval and Vendome. No opposition was offered to this 
movement, the German troops being too exhausted by their recent 
exertions to pursue. The line of the Loir was reached on the 13th, 
and a defensive position taken up on the right bank, extending between 
the two above-mentioned towns. By his retreat westward, General 
Chanzy renounced all chance of a junction with Bourbaki, and left open 
the direct road to Tours, which had to be abandoned as a seat of 
Government. 
But little was known at the German head-quarters at this period 
about what was going on to the south of Gien, and great caution was 
essential in the event of an advance towards Paris being meditated by 
Bourbaki. It would not be safe to move too far westward, as it would 
leave the direct road to the capital open. Orleans was accordingly 
looked upon as the centre from which all offensive operations had to be 
conducted, and to which the troops should in every case return. 
In the belief that Chanzy meant to make a stand behind the Loir, 
a general advance towards Vendome was ordered, the I. Bavarian Corps 
being sent back to Orleans, and Gien held by a strong detachment. 
The Grand Duke, on the right of the line, came into contact with the 
French outposts at Freteval on the 13th and 14th of December; but owing 
to the wet weather and bad roads, the remainder of the army only 
reached Coulommiers on the 16th. 
On the same afternoon, General Chanzy, having little confidence in 
the shattered morale of his troops, determined again to retreat, and 
eventually reached Le Mans on the 19th with some loss. 
All hope of a decisive battle was now lost; and, on the other hand. 
