THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART III.) 
573 
column of advance on the 6th and 7th January, and it was only after 
some hard fighting that the line of Le Thiel, Authon, and the Braye 
river was attained. The weather became now very bad, and the severe 
frost of the 8th was succeeded by a heavy fall of snow, making the January, 
roads very slippery and adding much to the difficulty of the march. 
On the 9th the central column succeeded in pushing as far as the line of 
the Narrain, but on the two flanks the resistance met with prevented their 
getting further than Connerre and Brives. On the 10th the forward 
movement of the Germans was continued, and resulted in driving back 
the right and centre of the French to their main fortified position in 
front of Le Mans. On their left, however, the passage of the 
17th Division to the right bank of the river was successfully opposed, 
and the ground held as far in advance as Montfort. The French 
position on the 11th extended from the Le Mans and Tours road on 
the right to Monfort and Lambron on the left. It was held by the 
16th, 17th, and 21st Corps, the extreme right being entrusted to some 
Mobiles from Brittany. It was evident on both sides that a decisive 
battle was imminent. Prince Frederick Charles determined on the 
12th to outflank the enemy by making a converging attack, and trans¬ 
ferred the whole of the XIII. Corps to the right bank of the Huisne. Battle of 
During the consequent movement of troops, a stubborn fight took Le Mans ' 
place along the whole line, and ground was gradually gained on the 
French left and centre. On their right, the levies from Brittany 
gave way at nightfall in panic when attacked by a small portion of the 
X. Corps (who were advancing up the Tours-Le Mans road). Asa 
result, the position was virtually turned, and orders for retreat at once 
reluctantly given. Favoured by the darkness of the night and a 
heavy fog the next morning, the main portion of the French forces 
retired unobserved on the road to Alen<?on. The direction of the 
retreat was eventually altered to the westward, and a position taken up 
at Laval behind the Mayenne, after some severe rear-guard fighting. 
The German III. and X. Corps occupied Le Mans, the division of 
the IX. was sent back to Orleans, and the Duke of Mecklenburgh 
directed to proceed at once northward towards Rouen. But little 
further took place on this theatre of war, as the operations of Chanzy’s 
troops were put a stop to by the armistice at the end of January. 
The Loire army appears in this campaign to have needlessly sacrificed 
both the lives and the morale of a large proportion of the troops. The 
columns which disputed the German advance from the Loir to Le Mans 
were too strong to act simply ,as rear-guards and too weak to act 
independently as corps of operation. When forced back on their 
defensive position their morale was much shaken, and affected the fighting 
powers of the remainder of the force. It was undoubtedly dangerous 
to leave the right of the line to an unsupported division of raw levies, 
though this apparently arose more from misadventure than calculation. 
On the German side, it may be noticed that the detachment of the 
Duke of Mecklenburgh to the right bank of the Huisne laid him open to 
be beaten in detail. The fighting power of the Loire army seems to 
have been unduly undervalued, and under more fortunate circumstances 
the issue of the engagement might have been very different. It is 
