576 
THE BRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART III.) 
however, arrived that the II. Corps had been ordered from Paris, and 
that, combined with the whole of the VII. Corps, had arrived on the line 
Nuits-Chatillon on the 12th of the month. It was apparent that, on 
account of the distance to be traversed, no immediate assistance was 
available; but if the crisis could only be delayed for a few days, the 
pressure of these new reinforcements on the French rear would be felt. 
The great importance of strongly holding his ground at all risks was 
most firmly impressed upon General Werder by the Head-Quarter Staff. 
Battle of On the morning of the 15th, the French advanced to the attack in 
SthJan.^ three main bodies against Montbeliard, Hericourt, and Chagny. The 
right column (15th Corps) succeeded in establishing itself in the town 
of Montbeliard, but the Germans held the strong castle. On the centre 
and left the advanced posts were driven in, with the exception of 
Chenebier. Why Cremer ; s Division, which was on the extreme left, was 
not sent along the main route towards Frahier on this day seems difficult 
to understand; as also the march of the 18th Corps, which might have 
availed itself of a good road through Lure, instead of using nearly 
impassable footpaths. 
After a night of misery from the excessive cold, the attack was 
i6th Jan. renewed on the 16th along the whole line. The advanced post of 
Chenebier was taken, but the main German positions remained intact. 
Early on the 17th Chenebier was again lost, but afterwards retaken. 
Fighting without much spirit was carried on during the day with no 
marked results, and in the evening Bourbaki, despairing of carrying 
out his plans, ordered a retreat. It appears tolerably certain that if he 
had made his attack more vigorously on the third day, or renewed it 
on a fourth, the German position would have been carried. The attack 
on the right flank was never seriously pushed, and the fortress of Belfort 
might well have made a vigorous sortie with half its garrison at an 
opportune moment. 
The plan of the French Government for the relief of Belfort had thus 
entirely failed. The idea of crushing Werder, raising the siege, and 
then advancing in force against the German communication, was doubtless 
seductive, but it entailed a long march through a sterile and moun¬ 
tainous country in close proximity to a neutral frontier. Belfort was in 
no immediate need of assistance, and its relief would in itself in no way 
influence the lot of the capital. 
The main object of the Government was to raise the siege of Paris, 
and to effect that in the most easy way the lines of communication with 
Germany had to be cut. It would have been far better to have advanced 
at once northward, and have worked for the main object of the Govern¬ 
ment scheme, in lieu of wasting time in the comparatively Unimportant 
relief of Belfort. Curiously enough, the Germans* communications were 
at this time especially vulnerable. The entire supplies of the great mass 
of their forces on the Loire, at Paris, and in the north, were dependent 
on the existence of the single line of rail from Frouard to Blesme—the 
cutting of which, even for a couple of days, would enforce the raising 
of the blockade of Paris. From Dijon to Blesme was but little over 
100 miles, and if commenced in time there was absolutely only Etappen 
troops to bar the march. 
