THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART III.) 
577 
The roads were good, the left flank could be easily secured by holding 
the defiles of the Cote d’Or, Werder might be observed by a detached 
force, and Langres would serve as a point d’appui at which stores might 
be collected. By starting from Dijon on the 1st January, Blesme might 
have been reached on the 11th or 12th, and the entire aspect of the war 
operations changed. That such a movement entailed some alter risk 
is of course obvious; but still it was quite possible, and afforded a most 
brilliant opening of which unfortunately no advantage was taken. 
On the 17th the Erench retreated in disorder along the valleys of the Retreat of 
Ognon and Doubs, and eventually reached Besan^n on the 22nd, being Bourbakl * 
followed up by the troops of Werder. Here it became evident that 
fresh forces were threatening the intended line of retreat, and endeavour¬ 
ing to cut off the French corps from their natural base of Lyons. 
These newly arriving troops were the H. and VII. Corps, under General Advance of 
Manteuffel, who, as has been mentioned, were at Chatillon and Nuits on Manteuffel 
the 12th January. From these points it would have been advantageous, 
both on account of the good roads, and the presence on the flank of the 
hostile fort of Langres, to advance directly on Dijon and overwhelm the 
Garibaldians there situated. The critical position of General Werder, 
however, in front of Belfort, induced Manteuffel to march directly to his 
assistance, through the difficult defiles'of the Cote d^Or. By following 
this course the pressure on the French flank would be sooner felt, and 
in the event of the by no means impossible contingency of the XIV. 
Corps being compelled to retreat, the rear of the French pursuing army 
could be attacked. Orders were accordingly issued to cross the Cote 
d 5 Or in three main columns—an operation of difficulty on account of the 
severe frost, and of danger from the total absence of lateral communica¬ 
tions. On the 17th of January the defiles were passed, in the face of 
a trifling resistance, and the main road from Langres to Dijon reached. 
On the 18th the march eastward was resumed, the left flank being well 
in advance, and on the following day, in consequence of the news of the 
successful issue of Hericourt, a wheel to the right Was ordered, and the 
line of the Saone reached at Dampierre and Gray. By previous 
arrangement, the base of supply was shifted from Chatillon to Epinal. 
Bourbakfis position was now critical. While Werder was following 
upon his rear, the advance of Manteuffel threatened him on the flank, 
and in the only path of safety lay the neutral Swiss frontier. To the 
corps of Garibaldi had been entrusted the duty of covering the exposed 
flank, but the troops at Dijon were not sufficiently strong for that 
purpose, and the nature of his task does not appear to have been un¬ 
derstood by the Italian General. 
Justly appreciating the strategic situation, General Manteuffel deter¬ 
mined to advance at once southward, and, masking the force of Garibaldi, 
to effectually cut off the retreat of the main French army. The fulfilment 
of such a plan taxed to the utmost the efficiency of his troops, and 
entailed the great risk of losing his lines of communication. The only 
way to obtain a great result was to pin Bourbaki against the Swiss 
frontier; and to effect this, the II. and VII. Army Corps would have to 
advance rapidly, and act for the time independently of the XIV., 
which was following up the retreat. The manoeuvre was a remarkably 
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