THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAE (.PART III.) 
579 
the two Governments, hostilities came to an end, and the fortress was 
formally surrendered to the German troops on the 18th February. 
The operations of Manteuffel, under very difficult circumstances, seem 
to have been most skillfully carried out. The departure of Werder from 
his views with regard to an immediate concentric advance on'Besant^on 
probably prevented the occurrence of another Sedan, but still it led to 
an equivalent result being obtained with much less loss. The disasters 
of Bourbaki* s retreat may be fairly attributed to other causes than the 
deficiency of the material he had to deal with. The measures necessary 
to secure the flank of his advance would, if carried out, have allowed of 
a safe retreat. Bourbaki considered that it was the duty of Garibaldi 
to protect his communications; while Garibaldi avers with some justice 
that he had not enough men for the purpose, nor was his task clearly 
pointed out to him. These unfortunate misconceptions appear to have 
arisen chiefly from the constant interferences of the civil with the military 
authorities, and it is difficult to apportion the blame. Assuming, 
however, that Garibaldi was only capable of holding Dijon, it would 
appear that since the fortress of Auxonne was occupied by French 
troops, the ground to the right of that town— i.e. } the country lying 
between the Doubs and Saone—should naturally have been guarded by 
Bourbaki. If the 15th Corps had, as originally intended, been left near 
Auxonne, the retreat would have been comparatively safe. Even as it 
was, the measures taken to cover the mountain passes were most 
inefficient, and if they had been held strongly there was nothing to 
prevent a successful march through the Mouthe-Foncine defile. 
The three days* delay at Besan^n was most unfortunate, and there 
seems to have been a misunderstanding as to the amount of the provisions 
in the place, which were quite sufficient to victual the army for a march 
through the mountains. The whole key to the matter seems, however, 
to lie in the want of vigour with which the battle of Hericourt was 
fought. The weather was certainly adverse, but the one chance of 
keeping the raw French levies effective was to force a success regardless 
of expenditure. In spite of the declamations of both sides as to their 
respective valour, the losses* tell too truly that frost and disease were 
the most formidable opponents encountered. The curious error by 
which the French Commander-in-Chief was deceived on the 29th as to 
the terms of the armistice is difficult to explain; but it is worthy of 
note that all these accidental delays by which the fates of armies were 
settled were invariably favourable to the German cause. 
Campaign in the North. —After the fall of Metz, General Manteuffel 
was appointed to the command of the I. Army, which was destined for 
operations to the north of Paris. The VII. Corps was detailed to 
garrison Metzf and besiege Thionville and Montmedy ; the 1st Infantry 
* The total loss of Werder’s corps from the 10th to the 20th January was 317 killed, 1500 
wounded. The French loss probably amounted to 8000 men. 
f The 3rd Reserve Division was attached to the VII. Corps. Its Landwehr infantry acted as 
escort to Germany of the captive army ; while the remainder, under General von Senden, relieved 
the 1st Infantry Division at Mezibres on the 21st November, 
