THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART III.) 
583 
considering tlie raw levies opposed to him, he was so successful as 
might have been expected of him. Though the weather was 
undoubtedly bad and unfavourable to its movement, the German 
cavalry do not seem to have done their usual share of the work, con¬ 
sidering that the French Army of the North had but one mounted 
regiment. At St. Quentin, again, an absurd attempt was made to 
surround Faidherbe, which converted what might have been a crushing 
victory into but a trifling success. * 
The action of Faidherbe, on the French side, seems most meritorious. 
With raw ill-clad levies he succeeded in flghting three obstinate battles 
with the veterans of the I. Army. The troops of General Briand, on 
the other hand, seem to have displayed little activity, contenting them¬ 
selves with reconnaissance and small actions, and never venturing on 
a general engagement. Why the two French masses did not act in 
unison will always be a matter of curiosity. Although fair reasons 
might exist for not uniting the French armies, they might surely have 
manoeuvred for combined action. Manteuffel was more than once in a 
critical state from the advance of Faidherbe, and it may be easily con¬ 
ceived that an additional force of 25,000 men brought against him 
might have materially altered the aspect of affairs. Without entering 
into detail, it must be admitted that the action of the French Army of 
the North was very remarkable, and leads one to the conclusion that 
the intrinsic defects of a raw soldiery may be in a great measure 
obviated by a judicious leader. Although Faidherbe did not follow up 
his successes at the Hallue or Bapaume, it was undoubtedly with good 
reason. He made the most of the material entrusted to him by not 
requiring too much from it, and his power of preserving the discipline 
and efficiency of his troops contrasts favourably with that shown by the 
less fortunate commanders of the Armies of the East and West. 
The siege of Paris by the III. and IV. German Armies, for the rais^ siege of 
ing of which the wars in the provinces had been waged without success, PariSi 
must now again be reverted to. The issue of the action at Le Bourget,* 
the news of the fall of Metz, and the unsuccessful attempts of M. Thiers 
to obtain peace, led naturally to much apprehension in the capital, and 
in the beginning of November a fresh organisation of the military 
forces was made, and the formation of three distinct armies decreed. 
The nominal effective of these forces was very large, and presented a 
great disproportion to their actual value. The troops of the 2nd Army, 
under General Ducrot, were alone available for field operations, and 
may be fairly estimated at 105,000 men. Preparations were made to 
utilise these newly formed forces in a grand sortie to the north-west 
towards Rouen—a plan which was abandoned, however, as soon as the 
news arrived of the successful issue of the battle of Coulmiers,f and the 
recapture of Orleans by de Paladines. To second the efforts of the 
advancing army of the Loire, it was necessary to effect a trouee to the 
southward. Two courses were practically open to the French com- 
* 28th October. (See Part II.) 
f First Loire Campaign. 
