584 
THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART III.) 
mander—either to act on the left bank of the Seine, under the protection 
of the forts of Ivry and Montrouge, against a position which was known 
to be strongly entrenched, or to cross the Marne and advance against 
the heights of Villiers and Champigny, where the Germans were in less 
force. By constructing numerous bridges, the difficulty of crossing the 
river might in the latter case be reduced to a minimum, and the move¬ 
ment of the troops be protected by utilising the plateau of Mont Avron 
and the peninsula of St. Maur on the two flanks. Orders were accord¬ 
ingly given to carry out the sortie on the 29th of November; the 
materials for bridges having been collected the previous night at Join- 
ville, Nogent, Brie, and Neuilly, and the plateau of Avron crowned by 
artillery. Strong false attacks were at the same time to be made 
against the German positions in other quarters, especially towards 
I/Hay and Chevilly.* The operation appears to have been well 
planned, and if the extraordinary fatality which seemed to follow the 
French cause had not intervened, there is but little doubt the 15,000 
German troops in this quarter could not have arrested the movement. 
A rising of the waters of the Marne on the night of the 28th rendered 
it impossible to anchor the bridges, and the forward movement was 
delayed for 24 hours, enabling the besiegers to move reinforcements to 
Sortie of the threatened quarter. On the 30th, the troops of Ducrot, divided into 
Ducrot. three corps, crossed the river on ten bridges, their advance being pre¬ 
luded by a heavy cannonade from the plateau of Avron and Fort 
Nogent. The German outpost line was pushed in, and Champigny and 
the crest of the Coeuilly plateau held. In the face of the opposition 
encountered, no further advance was made on the 1st of December, and 
on the following day the Germans retook the initiative, and attacked 
with varying success the whole French line. The sortie having now 
completely failed, the French army withdrew without opposition across 
the Marne on the 3rd. 
It is not difficult to realise what would have been the fate of Ducrot 
if he had forced the German lines on the 30th of November. The 
Army of the Loire was at this date unable to defend itself, and could 
in no wise lend him a helping hand. Although a temporary relief of 
the investment would undoubtedly have taken place, it would not have 
affected the fate of the capital, and the French army, in an open country 
destitute of provisions, must have been speedily surrounded by troops 
detached from the blockading lines. 
The early part of December was spent in re-organising the defeated 
French troops, and after the reception of a despatch from Gambetta 
explaining the situation of affairs in the provinces, a fresh attack was 
ordered against the nort-west quarter. It was not apparently intended 
to make a sortie, but simply to push back the investing line and break 
Sortie the strict cordon of observation. After some unnecessary delay, the 
LeBourget.attack took place on the 21st of December between St. Denis and the 
Marne. General Yinoy, who commanded the right of the advance, pushed 
back successfully the outpost line, but all efforts directed against 
Le Bourget on the left failed. A bitter frost on the two following days 
* The corps of Vinoy captured L’Hay before he was informed of the change of the date of the 
main attack, and suffered severe loss in its retreat. 
