THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART III.) 
585 
prevented tlie renewal of operations, and the troops were withdrawn to 
Paris. On the 27th, a concentrated fire of artillery was directed by the 
Germans against the plateau of Avron, which had to be abandoned by 
the besieged the next day. 
At the beginning of the new year the position of affairs was some¬ 
what complex. The efforts of the Parisians to break the blockade had 
not hitherto been attended with success, but it was undoubted that the 
number of their effective troops had largely increased, and it was probable 
that a sortie on a large scale would be shortly attempted. Bourbaki, 
with about 90,000 men, was at this time near Bourges, in a somewhat 
disorganised state; Chanzy, at Le Mans, possessed nearly 150,000 men; 
while Faidherbe had a tolerably disciplined force of 50,000 men in the 
north. To the eastward, the corps of Garibaldi and Cremer amounted 
to about 30,000 men; while General Briand's troops at Havre numbered 
about 15,000. To prevent the concerted action of these diverse bodies, 
the German forces were thus disposed:—The III. and IY. Army effectually 
invested Paris ; the I. Army, in two main groups at Rouen and Amiens, 
covered the blockade to the north ; the II. Army had its main strength 
at Orleans, with detachments at Vendome, Blois, and Gien; the Duke 
of Mecklenburgh was posted at Chartres, to watch the approaches from 
Le Mans and the west; while General Werder besieged and covered the 
investment of Belfort. 
The siege of Paris had already been protracted to an unexpected 
extent, and on account of the difficulties of transport no artillery attack 
had yet been made on its forts. This state of affairs was, however, 
altered on the 5th of January, when 96 heavy guns opened fire on the 
forts of Issy, Yanves, and Montrouge. To the north, east, and south, 
batteries were quickly formed, and a heavy fire maintained on both forts 
and houses within range. The actual effect of this bombardment was 
not at first very conspicuous. Fort Issy was the most damaged, but 
was still capable of repelling assault; and the killing of a few inoffensive 
inhabitants in the city only enraged the populace. The provisions, 
however, were rapidly coming to an end, and a final supreme effort was 
ordered to be made against the enemy's lines. About 83,000 men were 
assembled on the 19th January, under cover of Mount Yalerien, and 
advanced against Buzenval, La Bergerie, and Montretout in three main 
columns. After encountering severe loss in attempting to force the 
strongly entrenched German positions, a retreat was ordered, and the 
last hope of the beleaguered city destroyed. Provisions for a few days 
only now remained, and necessitated the acceptance of an armistice on 
the 28th January, 1871, which virtually terminated the greatest and 
most obstinately fought war of modern times. 
[For the convenience of the student, a list of the principal books on the campaign is appended. 
All the German works of note have been translated into either English or French:—Franco-German 
War (official account); accounts of Borbstaedt, Blume, Lecompte, Mazade, Vial, Ambert, C.D., 
Vandevelde, Rustow, Niemann, Farcy; Operations of I. Army (3 vols.), by Wartensleben and 
Schell; German Artillery, by Hoffbauer; German Engineers, bv Goetze; Operations of South Army, 
by Wartensleben; XIV. Corps, by Lohlein; Operations de la III. Armee, by Hahnke; Operations du 
V. Corps, by Heydekamp ; La Premiere Armee de la Loire, by De Paladines ; La Deuxieme Armee 
de la Loire, by Chanzy; L’Invasion dans l’Est, by Cremer; La Guerre en Province, by Freycinet; 
L’Armee du Rhin, by Bazaine ; L’Armee du Nord, by Faidherbe ; Journal d’un Officier de 1’Armee 
du Rhin; Trois mois a 1’Armee de Metz; La Guerre dans l’Ouest, by Rollin; Siege de Paris, by 
Diicrot; Do. by Vinoy and Le Due ; Metz Campagne et Negotiations; La Guerre le jour en jour; 
Etude d’ensemble de la Campagne ; Operations of Bavarian Corps.] 
The last 
sortie. 
75 
